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INTRODUCTION 
"Man is above all a moral being." If not always explicitly 
formulated, this proposition is none the less implied in the doctrines 
of the great majority of Western thinkers. It is no accident that Moral 
Philosophy has traditionally been one of the main branches of philoso-
phical speculation, Moral Philosophy developes as an attempt to account 
for several factors of experience. Ultimately these factors can, it 
seems, be reduced to two: first, there is the awareness that certain of 
man's acts are either good or evil and that consequently by their actions 
men begin to exist either goodly or evilly; second, there is the recogni-
tion that while there may indeed be extrinsic causes, nevertheless in a 
very real and most significant way the immediate or proximate cause of 
these acts is somehow the individual himself. l~ich is to say that Moral 
Philosophy begins with the evidence that men perform purposeful acts; acts 
which are, in fine, grounded in cognition and volition. Yet as Vernon 
Bourke has recently shown; there is less than unanimity among moralists 
regarding the precise role to be assigned to the intellect and will in 
1 Will in Western Thought: An H1storico-Critical Survey, 
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964). 
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bringing the moral act into existence. 
This thesis will follow one man's attempt to give a rational 
account of the evidence of moral existence. In presenting Saint Thomas 
Aquinas' account of the nature and causes of moral being this study will 
be divided into three parts. According to St. Thomas moral existence is 
a mode of being attributable primarily to the ~ of intelligent beings. 
Therefore we will begin by examining AGuinas' explanation of the fact of 
change and activity manifested by all the beings of our direct experience. 
When the groundwor!~ f~r 3 prop6r understanding of creaturely activity has 
been laid, Chapter Two will analyze the activity proper to man as a man, 
namely moral activity. Men begin to exist goodly and evilly depending on 
whether they perform good or evil acts. Furthermore, since this is a real 
becoming, a coming-to-be, there are real causes. The scope of this chap-
ter is thus to expose what for St. Thomas is the nature and causes of moral 
existence. Finally, when the reality of moral existence has been uncovered 
by exposing its interior causes, its ultimate interior causes, Chapter 
Three will attempt to penetrate further the Significance of St. Thomas' 
thought, by contrasting the causes operative in the coming into being of 
a good and evil act. This contrast may prove fruitful, for there is a 
radical difference between good and evil and between the causes of good 
and evil--indeed, the difference is as great as the difference between be-
ing and non-being. 
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THE DYNAMISM OF CREATURELY BEING: APPETITION 
Any understanding of the doctrine of Saint Thomas Aquinas must 
be said to be wanting if it overlooks the significance of his treatment 
of appetition. This notion is fundamental for a proper grasp of Aquinas' 
"philosophy" because it is the intelligible expression and explanation of 
an essential aspect of the fact of change. Aquinas introduces this notion 
as the expression of his conviction that the beings of experience are 
the very opposite of static. Change is an aspect of the "stubborn facts"l 
.of experience. Beings are radically dynamic, they change. Accepting the 
"stubborn facts" of change, Aquinas goes on to render its nature intelli-
gible in the language of appetition. The purpose of this chapter is thus 
to once again emphasize the fact that Aquinas' is a metaphysics of the 
dynamism manifest in creaturely being. 
1 If we be permitted to use an expression that appears in the 
writings of one of the foremost contemporary metaphysicians of change, viz. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, (10th printing: New 
York: Mentor Books, 1960) 22. --
1 
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ACTIVITY AND CHANGE 
It has been said that one of the primary "stubborn facts" of ex-
perience is the fact of beings undergoing change. Let us begin then by 
dwelling awhile on this fact. What does one experience in an encounter 
with the world? The primary data of experience seem, to be the irredu-
cible evidence that one is confronted ,with a multiplicity of individual 
existents. The immediate data of experience is the multiplicity of in-
dividual substances, entities, individual ontological units, call them 
what you will, all having this one thing in common, namely, that they ex-
ist. 2 One experiences them as beings existing apart and in a way inde-
pendent from each other and from oneself. They are beings unto them-
selves. A more accurate answer would seem to be, however, that one ex-
periences a multiplicity of individual existents each manifesting various 
levels of activity.3 
2 Cf. John Wild, "Tendency: The Ontological Ground of Ethics," 
Journal of Philosophy, XLIX, (1952), 65. Speaking of the commonness evi-
denced in this direct encounter with the first data of experience, Wild 
says: "In spite of their mutual exclusiveness, one exists as much as an-
other. In thiS, each is similar to all the rest. All this is obvious, 
one may say." What is also obvious is that within this same experience 
one is aware of difference. The idea of a multiplicity of individual ex-
istents devoid of any reference to difference is a contradiction. It is 
simply unthinkable because beings cannot be many and individual without 
being distinct. Consequently, Donald O'Grady says "Di..stinction, separa-
tion, in and among eXistents, gives rise to negation in judgment. This 
is and that is, but this is not that. This and That are differently. Each 
really is, but also each really is not." Further Notes on 'Being,' tEsse, t 
and 'Essence' in an Existential Metaphysics," International Philosophicii' 
Q?arter1y, III, (1963) 613. 
3 A distinction seems to be in order. While the preceding 
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Activity seems to pervade much of reality; it certainly per-
vades much of experience. On the level of material reality, objects as 
inanimate as silver and wood manifest change. Silver tarnishes and a 
piece of cut wood readily decays, and both are susceptible to the effects 
of fire, each in its own way. Extending the powers of sense, one can 
approach the world in the guise of the physical scientist. Now one dis-
covers that the universe is vaster than the imagination can picture or 
the intellect can adequately conceive, and that this universe is, as far 
as it is known, exceedingly active. Change pervades the whole of astro-
nomical experience. Turning to the "microscopic" world, the atomic and 
the sub-atomic particles come into "view." What becomes readily apparent 
is the fact that even at this level, or one could say especially at this 
level, beings evidence themselves as active, and as changing, as being 
and yet becoming. 
A special kind of activity is manifest by what are called liv-
ing beings. Their activity is a living one. Having begun to exist, they 
paragraphs had been speaking of change and activity, it is perhaps more 
accurate to say that one witnesses beings undergoing various levels of ac-
tivity. For while every change can be understood as an activity, not 
every activity precisely as activity need involve a change. For God is 
Iesum !!.!.!. Subsistum, the act of all acts and yet there i.e no change in 
Him. Nevertheless, since the activites of the beings of our direct ex-
perience do, for the most part, involve some kind of change, that is a 
procession from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality (while an 
activity need not involve such a procession, though it may indeed, at least 
for limited beings, depend on the change already having taken place, as, 
for example, knowing presupposes the coming to know) change and activity 
will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
4 
are nourished, grow, reproduce, and finally cease to exist. These are all 
activities, all manifestations of various kinds of change. But they are 
activities proper to one kind of being and lacking in another; whence one 
distinguishes and divides the beings of experience into living and non-
living. Both kinds of beings, that is the living and non-living, are, and 
both act and change, but they are and they change differently. 
Of the living beings, one encounters some that are sentient and 
still others that are intellectual as well. This further division follows 
the different activities performed by wh~t ~re called brute animals and 
men. Being material, brutes and men are susceptible to the changes that 
affect and are affected by their material bodies. One can observe them 
undergoing changes in place or position, changing in the line of deteriora-
tion. They can suffer effects of fire and so forth. They seem to be sus-
ceptible to all of the changes that are open to material beings, and sim-
ilarly they appear to be open to the changes undergone by all living beings. 
Nevertheless, being the kind of material things they are, they perform 
other kinds of activities, they undergo other kinds of change. 
The activities proper to brutes are those of sense knowledge and 
the activities following upon sensation, while the activities proper to 
men are called intellectual knowledge and the activities following upon in-
tellection. But the beginning of knowledge as an activity involves change 
--as experience teaches. Thus besides change in the purely material level 
one observes the different and indeed more perfect activities manifest by 
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brutes and men. Their activities are proportioned to their being. They 
are, and they act, but they are and they act differently. 
The evidence of activity and change is overwhelming. It pre-
sents itself to the layman and scientist alike. Man cannot escape the 
"stubborn fact" that the primary datum cf experience is a confrontation 
with a multiplicity of individual existents all manifesting various lev-
ela of activity, all in some way or another undergoing or having under-
gone changes--changes that are proportioned to their mode of being. 
The philosopher's task i~ clear. It is,in the last analysis, 
to make intelligible the universal fact that the beings of experience man-
ifest themselves as individual existents, each existing actively, each ac-
cording to its own mode. And so one witnesses St. Thomas attempting to 
4 
render this fact intelligible. 
PERFECTION--THE GOOD AND THE END 
Let it first be ncted that change is undergone by beings whose 
actuality is not complete. Gilson, when speaking of the significance of 
St. Thomas' proof for God's existence, states the matter precisely. "Change', 
he says, "is possible only in beingswhose actuality is incomplete, and its 
4 By and large the above analysis of the beings of direct ex-
periences is one which St. Thomas makes his own. See, for example, Summa 
Contra Gentiles, III, 20c. 
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result always is either to add to their actuality or to subtract some-
thing from it.,,5\nd how could it be otherwise? If a thing were com-
pletely actual, l.n what way could it change? Indeed, there would be noth-
ing for such a thing to become, nor would there be anything about it which 
would allow of being lost. Complete actuality is itself simple and indi-
visible. Where there is change, then, there is something either acquiring 
additional actuality or losing actuality; where there is change the.re is, 
incomplete actuality; where there is change there is, ultimately, actuality 
and potentiality. 
Now a thing is perfect in so far as it is actual. 6 And since 
being (esse) is the actuality of everything, even the actuality of form,7 
8 it follows that a thing is perfect in so far as it has being. A thing is 
perfect inasmuch as it is actual, inasmuch as it has being, inasmuch as it 
exists. 
5 Elements of Christian Phil.eo2hy, (New York: Doubleday & 
Co., Inc., 1960) 67. --
6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 5, 1c. 
7 ~.1., I, 4, 1, ad3; I, 3, 4c; ~.f.Q., tI, 54c. 
8 ,2.1., I, 5, lc. Cf. I, 4, 2c: "Now all the perfections of 
all things pertain to the perfection of being; for things are perfect pre-
cisely so far as they have being after some fashion." Translation is taken 
from Anton C. Pegis (ed.) Basic l-lritings .2! Saint Thomas Aquinas, (12th 
printing: New York: Random House, Inc., 1945), 2 Vols. Unless otherwise 
noted, translations from the Summa Theologiae will be taken from Pegis' 
edition. 
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Anything, then, to the extent that it exists is perfect. And 
yet, none of the beings of direct experience are completely perfect, for 
none of them are completely actual. That is, none of them are pure actu-
alities. In brief, the beings of direct experience, what St. Thomas calls 
substances, are actual and perfect, but not completely so, for they mani-
fest activity. In keeping with the evidence of experience, Aquinas says 
that by the fact that a thing exists substantially it is said to possess 
its "first perfection." But by the fact that a substance acts it acquires 
its "second perfection_,,9 One can summarize Aquinas' thought by saying 
that substances are, and to the extent that they are they are perfect. But 
substances act, as experience shows, and therefore through their activity 
and in some instances in the very activity itself (as, for example, the im-
manent activity of the act of knowing) they acquire additional actuality, 
which is to say they acquire additional perfection. Through their activity 
they begin to be completed. 
Why do substances act? Quite simply then. they act in order to 
become perfect, as much as each can. There is activity because everything 
seeks its own perfection, the perfection it does not yet possess but which 
it can attain. St. Thomas is quite specific about this. "Every creature," 
9 For St. Thomas' distinction of first and second perfection see 
S.T., It 73c; I, 6, 3c; III, 29, 2c; !.f.Q., II, 46c; quaestiones Disputa-
tae ~ Veritate, I, 10, ad3; II, 2c; and esp. XXI, Sc. 
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he says, "intends to acquire its own perfection. II 10 Beings naturally seek 
to perfect themselves through activity.ll They do this by seeking first 
to retain the actuality they already possess. With all the strength of 
their being, they strive to resist corruption and anything that in anyway 
tends to dtminish their actuality.12 Beyond this, beings naturally seek to 
acquire additional perfection. And so St. Thomas says, "it belongs to 
every being to seek its perfection and the conservation of its being, and 
this in the face of each being according to its mode •••• " 13 But perfection 
is actuality and therefore beings act in order to be more fully actual. 
Now in seeking their perfection beings seek their good, for what 
perfects a thing is said to be that thing's good. 14 The idea of good is 
10 S.T., I, 44, 4c; cf. ~ Veritate, XXII, 1, sed. contra., 4; 
2.£.Q., I, 37c; III, 3c. 
11 2.£.Q., III, 3c: "Moreover, every action and movement are for 
the sake of some perfection." The Summa Contra Gentiles, four books in 5 
volumes translated by A.C. Pegis, J.F. Anderson, V.J. Bourke, and C.J. 
O'Neil respectively, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955-7). Unless other-
wise noted, translations from the Summa Contra Gentiles will be taken from 
this Doubleday edition. 
12 De Veritate, XXI, Ie: "But everything which already has be-
ing naturally lOves its being and with all its strength preserves it." The 
~ Veritate, in 3 volumes: Volume 1 (Qq 1-9) translated by R.W. Mulligan, 
S.J.; Volume 2 (Qq 10-20) translated by J.V. McGlynn, S.J.; Volume 3 (Qq 
21-29) translated by R. W. Schmidt, 8.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954). 
Unless otherwise noted,translations from the Quaestiones Disputatae ~!!!­
itate will be taken from this Regnery edition. 
13 S.C.G., I, 72c. Cf., De Veritate.,XXI, 2c; S.C.G., III, 3c 
For a more complete statement of these basic inclinations-as 'they are man-
ifested in man see 2.1., I-II, 94, 2c. 
14 ~.£.Q., 1, 37c; III, 3c. 
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therefore bound up with perfection, as the idea of desire is bound up with 
seeking. Beings seek, which is to say they desire, the perfection of their 
being which is called their good. 
This is not to say, however, that beings are not already good. 
For to the extent that they exist indeed to that extent they are actual, 
perfect, and therefore good. Speaking of the relationship between actual-
ity, perfection and goodness St. Thomas says, "Every being, as being, is 
good. For all being, as being has actuality and is in some way perfect, 
since every act is some sort of perfection, and perfection implies desira-
bility and goodness •••• 1115 It follows that beings are perfect and there-
fore good inasmuch as they are actual, inasmuch as they exist. But as be-
ings are said to have their first and second perfection, so they are said 
to be good ia a qualified sense or good absolutely. There is, then, this 
relationship between a substance's act of being and its goodness: 
• • • goodness is divided into substantial and accidental, just 
as is the act of being. There is, however, this difference: a 
thing is called a being in an absolute sense because of its sub-
stantial act of existing; but because of its accidental act of 
existing it is not said to be absolutely •••• But just the opposite 
is true of good. From the point of view of its substantial good-
ness a tiling is said to be good in a certain sense, but from that 
of its accidental goodness it.is said to be good without qualifi-
cation. l6 
15 §. a! a It I, 5, 3c a 
16 ~ V4eritate, XXI, Sea 
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But what is the reason for this difference? S~ Thomas continues, 
A thing is called being inasmuch as it is considered absolutely, 
but good, as has already been made clear, in relation to other 
things. Now it is by its essential principles that a thing is 
fully constituted in itself so that it subsists; but it is not 
so perfectly constituted as to stand as it should in relation 
to everything 0y,side itself except by means of accidents added 
to the essence. 
The first perfection and the first good of a being is therefore its sub-
stantiality, that is, the fact that this substance exists at all. It is a 
perfection and a good to exist. Nevertheless, s~bstances manifest them-
selves actively, and this activity is an extension of the substance's act 
of existing, of its actuality, of its perfection, and of its good. And 
thus through its activity the substance can acquire its additional good or, 
perhaps it would be more correct to say, the substance can acquire its com-
plete good and is said to be good absolutely speaking. The manner in which 
the substance completes itself in the line of actuality is thus the meas-
ure of its goodness absolutely speaking. To the extent, then, that they 
exist indeed to that extent substances are actual, perfect, and therefore 
17 See also !.I., I, 5, 1, ad.l; B! Veritate, XXI, 5, adl; XXI, 
lc; XXI, 2c; !.Q.Q., III, 20c; Compendium The010giae ad Fratrem Reginaldum 
So~ ~ Carisstmwn, I, 109: "Sinc~ the good has the nature of perfec-
tion and of end, the twofold perfection and end of the creature disclose 
its t~ofold goodness. A certain perfection is observed in the creature in-
asmuch as it persists in its nature. This perfection is the end of its 
generation or formation. The creature has a further perfection which it 
raaches by its motion or activity. This perfection is the end of its move-
ment or operation." Translation is taken from Cyril Vollert, S.J. Campen-
~ £! Theology, (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947). Unless other-
wise noted, translations from the Compendium Theologiae will be taken from 
this edition. 
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good. Yet just as they are beings whose actuality is incomplete, so they 
are beings whose goodness is incomplete. They are good things seeking 
additior~l goodness. 
act. 
We have thus returned to our starting point, the fact that beings 
18 They act for a purpose which is their end. Their end is the com-
pletion of their being which is their full perfection. The good is that 
which is perfective of things and is therefore what all things desire as 
19 their end. 
SOME INCLINATION FOLLOWS EVERY FORM 
At this point it becomes necessary to pose a question. Exactly 
how are beings ordained to their end? Beings desire their good as their 
end, but what is the principle or principles of activity whereby they pro-
ceed to actively seek their end? After all, it is one thing to desire a 
good but quite another to pursue it, to attain it, and to enjoy it. And 
even if we say that beings seek their perfection, we have by no means spe-
cified what lies at the source of this active seeking of one's perfection. 
An answer to this difficulty could be had by beginning with St. 
18 !.Q.Q., III, 2c; Q! Veritate, XXII, 1, sed. contra. 4. 
19 !.Q.G., III, 3c. 
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Thomas' statement that "some inclination follows every form." 20 This dic-
tum merely serves as a starting point, however, for in itself it does lit-
tle but state in a universal proposition that every being tends to acquire 
its own perfection. For, as it will become evident, the inclination fol-
lowing every form finds its dynamic expression in the activity of the being 
seeking its perfection. It is the expression of an appetite. Neverthe-
less, the dictum does serve to give direction to the inquiry for it points 
to the more immediate principle of a being's activity, namely the being's 
form. 
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas reserves a hi.gh place for a be-
ing's substantial form (and to form in general, i.e., accidental as well 
as substantial). For St. Thomas the substantial form is "that by whichll 
the substance, that is, the basic entitative unit given in the immediate 
data of sense experience, is a "that which is.,,2l In brief, the substan-
tial form is a principle of the thing's being by being nothing less than 
the complement of the substance as sUbstance,22 and this even where the 
substance has no admixture of matter. Gilson summarizes the role played 
by substantial form thusly: "The proper role of the form is, therefore, 
20 ~.!., I, 80 lc. 
21 ~.f.Q., II, 54c. 
22 Ibid. 
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to constitute substance !! substance. As St. Thomas says, it is what 
makes it to be substance and enables it to achieve substantiality.1I23 
The sub~tantia1 form is a principle of specification. By its substantial 
form the substance is determined to be the ~ of substance that it is. 
Thus form gives actuality to the substance by giving it content, structure, 
specification. 
It gives actuality in another ~'1ay also. The substance is said 
to be but also to act in virtue of the ~ of thing it is. Recall that 
St. Thoma$} said that "it belongs to every being to seek its perfection ••• 
and this in the case of each being according .!:2 lli. ~.,,24 Each being 
according to its mode: the Significance of these words is that beings are, 
but they are !h!! they are, and they are inclined to perfect and conserve 
themselves according to ~ they are. The inclination of a being toward 
its end, its good, follows from its essence and is expressed through its 
nature, through the form Which is nothing less than a source of this in-
trinsic dynamic principle of a being's activities. Beings act and are 
acted upon the way that they are because they are what they are. Inasmuch 
as it is the substantial form which is the ultimate ground of a being's 
23 The Christian PhilosoEhy of §!. Thomas Aq~J.~_~~~.t trans., L.K. 
Shook, C.S.B., (2nd printing: New York: Random House, 1956), 32. 
24 ~.Q.Q., I, 72c; underlining is mine. 
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specification, of a being's essence, of a being's nature, St. Thomas says 
that "some inclination follows every form." Form is here seen to be a 
principle guiding the being's search for perfection, a source of its de-
sire for and inclination toward its good. A thing has for its good the 
~ of good that it does because it is the kind of thing that it is. It 
tends to perfect itself the way it does because it is the ~ of thing 
that it is. Beings seek to perfect themselves, each according to their 
mode. 
St. Thomas notes, however, that form is not the ultimate source 
of a being's actuality, nor, therefore, is it the ultimate source of a 
being's activity. For in the beings of our direct experience form is on 
the side of essence and is related to the act of existence (esse) as po-
tentiality to actuality. And so Aquinas says, 
Then, too, because being is compared even to the form itself as 
act. For in things composed of matter and form, the form is said 
to be the principle of being, for this reason: that it is the 
complement of the substance, whose act is being •••• 
II • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
On the other hand, in substances composed of matter and form 
there is a twofold compOSition of act and potentiality: the first, 
of the substance itself which is composed of matter and form: the 
second, of the substance thus composed and being; and this compo-
sition also can be said to be of that which is and being, or that 
which !! and that ~ which .! thing is. 25 - - -
25 Ibid., II, 54c. 
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In other words, the act of existing, !!!!, is the ulttmate principle of 
being. It is that Ex which the substance exists at all. It is the ac-
tuality of everything, says St. Thomas, "even the actuality of form.,,26 
Esse is the actuality of everything for 1n giving actuality to the form 
it gives actuality to the substance through the form. For to exist is 
the actuality of everything. Outside of existence there is only non-being, 
only nothingness. The form is not a principle of being unless it exists, 
and thus the act by which the form exists is the act by which the substance 
itself is, and, as we shall see, it is also the act by which the substance 
operates. 
The beings of our experience are composed of these two prtmary 
manifestations of act and potentiality, namely!!!!, the act of existing, 
and essence. Now if essence, be it simple or composed of matter and form, 
stands to the act of existing as potency limiting act; if!!!! is pure and 
un1imiting act;21 if !!!! is the actuality of everything so much so that 
there is no actuality absolutely speaking apart from the actuality of !!!!, 
then it does indeed seem incorrect to speak of essence as though it exer-
cised a causal influence on!!!!, as if essence were something in itself. 
28 What is not!!!! can only be non-esse, non-being purely and simply. The 
26 See Chapter I, page 6, note 1. 
21 Quaestiones Disputatae ~ Potentia Q!!, 7, 2, ad9. 
28 Cf. S.C.G., I, 28c. See Donald O'Grady, "Further Notes on 
'Being, lit I.aQ.,610:-l:S.-
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difficulty is that essence must not be understood as contributing some-
thing positive to.!!!,!. since the actuality of everything, every positive 
characteristic seems to come from .!!!,!.29 
But none of the beings of our experience is an unlUDited !!!!. 
While all of the actuality may indeed flow from!!!!, there is a real lUD-
itation placed on these esses. They are all esses of a certain intensity. 
Their.!!!.! is not the all of !!!! and yet is. What can such an .!!!.! be? 
It seems that it can only be an .!!!.! exerciSing itself limitedly, that is 
individually and specifically.30 Thus the individuality and specification 
of a being ought, perhaps, to be regarded as the very inner determination 
placed on an !!!! that is and yet is not the all of.!!!.!. Speaking of the 
distinction between essence and the act of existing (d'exister) Gilson re-
fers to the self and inner determination of the act of existing: "Chaque 
essence est posee un acte d'exister qu'elle Les8enc~7n'est pas et qui 
- - 31 l'inclut comme son lesse'~1 autodetermination." Again it seems diffi-
cult to see how it could be otherwise. The positive content of the beings 
of experience must come from their .!!!.!, their act of existing, since 
there is no actuality apart from this prUDordial act. Their.!!!.! is lUD-
29 See Fr. Gerald B. Phelan t s article entitled "The Being of 
Creatures, II Proceedings .2! !!!! American Catholic Philosophical Association, 
XXXI, (1957), 18 .. 25. . 
30 O'Grady, "Further Notes on 'Being,'1l I.J?Q. 
31 1! Thomisme, (Paris: Vrin, 1948), 54. 
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ited within itself, and this ltmitation is their essence taken in its posi-
tive content, that is as modus essendi. 
But what of the negative aspect, the potentiality and ltmitation 
manifested by these same beings? To be, and yet not to be unltmited !!!! 
is to be !!.!! of a certain ltmitation. This ltmitation is the "that be-
yond which" this being's.!!!! does not extend. There is a certain sense 
in which this being's!!!! is, but there is also a real sense in which it 
is not. Being!h!!!!!!, it is not !h!!!!!!, nor is it the!!!! of any-
thing else that is or that can be. The fact that this being is actual and 
yet is not the all of actuality is for this being a real absence, a real 
negation, though not for all of that is it an evil. It is stmply an ab-
sence, a lack, a real nothingness. 32 
Perhaps we have discovered the reason why beings act. If!!!! 
is primary; if it is in itself unltmited and pure act; and if the!!!! of 
the beings of experience is limited, then their activity is nought but 
ltmited !!!! seekins to overcome its Itmitation, as much as it can. Not 
only are beings actual and to that extent perfect inasmuch as they exist. 
They are also ordered to further actuality, and in this respect are in 
potentiality to further actuation. Which is to say that the ltmitation 
within which their !!!! is exercised ia in some way and to some extent 
32 O'Grady, "Further Notes on 'Being,'" I.P.Q. 
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capable of being overcome. 33 
But here once again the role of form or essence comes to the 
fore. There seems to be,34 as experience evidences, an ulttmate ltmita-
tion or guiding principle within which!!!! is exercised. The!!!! of 
a being ~ subsistence is an!!!! of a certain intensity. Now this basic 
intensity is the very nature, the essence of the being as subsisting. In-
dividual men are stmilarly men inasmuch as they are beings exercising an 
act of existing of a similar intensity. The activities performed by be-
ings exercising an act of existing of a similar intensity will be activities 
that follow from this initial or basic act of this intensity, which is to 
say that the a~tivities of being follow from the ~ of being it is. 
But all of the being's reality may not be its!!!!, for if !!!! 
is limited then this limitation is a certain bordering on nothingness, and 
the limitation shows a radical defect within esse as limited esse. Thus 
- -
to be a limited!!!! involves both a perfection and a deficiency. To be 
33 See Jacques Maritain, Existence ~ the Existent, trans. L. 
Galantiere and G.B. Phelan, (4th printing: New York: Image Books, Double-
day and Co., 1961), 51-55; ! Preface 12 Metaphysics: Seven Lectures ~ 
Being, (New York: Mentor Omega Books, 1962), 70-76. 
34 Seems, we say, because contemporary thought with its empha-
sis on evolution has raised philosophical questions about the intelligi-
bility of what the physical sciences call evolution. See Joseph Donceel's 
stimulating article entitled "Causality and Evolution: A Survey of Some 
Neo-scholastic Theories," 1!!! 1!!:! Scholasticism, XXXIX, (1965), 295-315. 
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limited!!!! is to be ~ with non-esse. 35 Posited into existence as a 
limited act of existing, the substances of our experience, the ~ which 
!,!, are radically dynamic. They are dynamic inasmuch as their.!.!!! is 
first and foremost an act; but they are also dynamic inasmuch as being a 
limited act they necessarily strive to overcome their limitations. They 
strive to perfect themselves by retaining their being and resisting any-
thing which in anyway seeks to corrupt them. Beyond this they seek to ex-
pand their being. Being limited, there is room for addition, for comple-
tion; existing by the act of esse this addition, for completion, is active-
ly sought. In short, substances "tend" to that which will complete their 
beings, to that which will perfect themselves absolutely speaking. 
APPETITE 
Now appetite is the name given to the prinCiple of a being's ten-
dencies, its inclinations. St. Thomas defines appetite as "nothing else 
36 than the inclination of a being desirous of a thing toward that thing." 
Appetite is therefore the desire that is innate in every being, which de-
sire is directed toward the end, which is the good, for which the being has 
received its existence but which it has not yet attained. This implies 
that beings are cut off from their end, their good absolutely speaking. But 
35 O'Grady, "Further Notes on 'Being," I.P.Q. 
36 !.!., I-II, 8, lc. 
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to be cut off from one's final good i8 a mark of imperfection, and conse-
quently the appetite manifested by the beings of our experience is in fact 
a mark of imperfection. 37 
So St. Thomas introduces the notion of appetition to account for 
an important aspect of the beings of our experience. The fact that beings 
tend to perfect themselves, that they seek to complete themselves 1 that they 
not only exist but are also related to that whereby they are made good ab-
solutely speaking, all this indicates firstly, that beings lack that which 
is their end, their ultimate perfection, and secondly, that these same be-
ings actively tend, are inclined, to acquire that which they lack. Appe-
tite is, then, an inclination that a being has for actively acquiring the 
good for which it has received existence but from which it is separated. 
"To desire or have appetency (appetere)" says St. Thomas, "is nothing else 
but to strive for something (ad aliquid petere), stretching, as it were, 
toward something which is destined for oneself.,,38 In orde!' to attain this 
good that is destined for oneself, this end, the beings of our experience 
have built in appetite to diffuse themselves actively--either by acting or 
by being acted upon, either by causing or by being caused. 
37 Q! Veritate, XXII, 2, ad4: lithe blessed who already enjoy 
the possession of God desire the continuance of their enjoyment. Further-
more, the enjoyment itself is a sort of appetite perfected by its object, 
although the name appetite implies imperfecti.on." 
38 Ibid., XXII, lc. 
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Appetite: Form 
Since appetite is nothing else than the inner dynamism of a 
thing's being, it is evident that it belongs to the existent which is its 
subject. And because substantial form is the first act of a being in the 
order of substance, appetite is the dynamic desire of a creature's form 
(i.e., the desire of an!!!! of a certain lUnitation or mode) seeking to 
further posit itself into existence in the line of additional actuality. 
Therein lies the significance of St. Thomas' dictum that "some inclination 
follows every form.,,39 Creatures are, and they are ~ they are, and they 
are inelined to perfeet and conserve themselves according to ~ they are. 
Reeall that St. Thomas says that "it belongs to every being to seek its 
perfection and the conservation of its being, and this in the ease of each 
being aeeording to its mode.,,40 Inelination, tendeney, follows from es-
senee and is expressed through nature, that is through the form whieh is 
nothing less than the source of this intrinsic dynamic principle of a be-
ing's aetivities: "The principle of every operation, furthermore, is the 
form by whieh a thing 1s in aet, since every agent acts so far as it is in 
act. So, the mode of operation consequent upon a form must be in aeeord-
with the mode of that form.,,41 
39 !.!., It 80, Ie. 
40 !.£.Q., I, 72e. 
41 ..!!?!2.., II, 47c. 
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Appetite: !!!! 
Nevertheless, appetite is existential, just as form is existen-
tial, because the act of the form is !!!! itself.42 !!!! is the actuality 
of everything. This primary position given to !!!! by St. Thomas pervades 
the whole of his philosophy and, if properly undetst:.,od t aHows no trace of 
essentialism. If the act of the form is~. then!!!! is the ulttmate 
first principle of a being's appetite. It is the first principle (disre-
garding the ult~te first principle of being Who Is God), though not ne-
cessarily the proxtmate principle of the individual's inclinations. It is 
first inasmuch as giving actuality to the form--being the !!!! of this spe-
cific and individual intensity--it gives actuality to the inclination fo1-
lowing this form. Thus while the proximate principle of an individual's 
inclination follows its form, this principle is, like the form itself, ul-
timately grounded in its act of existing. This is the meaning of St. Tho-
mas' statement that the threefold perfection of .!!!!. is IIsubsistere,1I ".!:,!!!_ 
2!:!t" and "reguiescere:" 
Since the essence of good consists in this, that something per-
fects another as an end, whatever is found to have the character 
of an end also has that of good. Now two things are essential to 
an end: it must be sought or desired by things which have not yet 
attained the end, and it must be loved by the things which share 
the end, and be, as it were enjoyable to them. For it is essen-
42 For an analysis of the primacy of esse in St. Thomas' thought 
also see Donald O'Grady's article entitled "Esse-;:n(i Metaphysics," The New 
Scholasticism, XXXIX, (1965), 283-294. ---- ------
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tially the same to tend to an end and in some sense to repose in 
that end. Thus by the same natural tendency a stone moves towards 
the center of the world and comes to rest there. 
These two properties are found to belong to the act of being. 
For whatever does not yet participate in the act of being tends 
toward it by a certain natural appetite.43 
!!!! is "subsistere" inasmuch as it is first and foremost the act of the 
substance as subsisting. But it is also "tendere" and "reguiescere" in-
asmuch as the substance as subsisting is related to its final good, the 
good that perfects completely, through its activities as tending (II~-
.2!!:!") toward that good and as resting in it (" r eguiescere") when it is 
possessed. As!!!! is the act of the substance as subsisting, so is it 
the act whereby the substance tends to complete itself. If beings are ac-
tive, then it is their!!!! itself which must be active. !!!! must be the 
ground of that activity as activity <as opposed to activity as the pot en-
tiality for activity). Being itself radically actual, esse is the source 
of every actuality, of every activity, of every instance of change under-
43 !!!. Veritate, XXI, 2c. "Respondeo dicendum, quod cum ratiQ 
boni in hoc consistat quod aliquid sit perfectivum alterius per modum fi-
nis: omne id quod invenitur habere rationem finiS, habet et rationem boni. 
Duo autem sunt de ratione finis; ut scilicet sit appetitum vel desideratum 
ab his quae finem nondum attingunt, aut sit dilectum, et quasi delectabile, 
ab his quae finem participant; cum ejusdem rationis sit tendere in finem, 
et in fine quodamoddo quiescere; sicut per camdem naturam lapis movetur ad 
medium, et quiescit in medio. Haec autem duo inveniuntur competere ipsi 
esse. Quae enim nondum esse participant, in esse quedam naturali appetitu 
tendunt;" Sancti Thomae Aquinatis. Opera Oumia. secundum impressionem 
petri fiaccadori Parmae 1852-73. <Photolithographie Reimpressa). Tamus IX. 
New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1948), 506a. 
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gone and performed by the beings of our direct experience. The ultfmate 
source of appetite is nought, then, but!!!! itself. 
KINDS OF APPETITE 
Although St. Thomas speaks at times of the nature of appetite in 
general, his most significant thoughts on the subject are, for the most 
part, couched in his discussions on the various kinds of appetite. In the 
light of what has already been noted, it will not be surprising to find St. 
Thomas distinguishing the kinds of appetition from the point of view of how 
various kinds of forms are related to a substance. 
Every being of our experience is a substance existing with its 
own act of being and with the inclinations proper to its own individualized 
nature. The inclinations of the substance's intrinsic principle of being 
(that is, of its individualized form) are called its natural appetite (!2-
petitus naturalis): 
It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To 
make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows 
every form: for example, fire, by its form is inclined to rise, 
and to generate its like •••• For in those things which lack know-
ledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own 
being--that is. to the being which is natural to each. Now this 
natural form is fgllowed by a natural inclination, which is called 
natural appetite. 
This appetite is cal lee natur31 because it follw~s a being's own individu-
alized form and because it is consequently an inclination ariSing from a 
44 S.T., I, 30, lc; cf. It 59, lc; !.£.Q., III, 26c; II, 47c; 
Q! Veritate,xXV,-lcj XXII, lc. 
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natural desire which, as nature, works with a natural necessity.45 Since 
natural appetency follows the natural fo~46 it is under a natural neces-
sity to tend to that which it tends,47 and thus the heavy naturally tends 
downward and fire naturally tends to rise and to heat. For such appetition 
apprehension is unnecessary, for the object of natural appetite is a single 
one and is not tended to only where there is violence. And so St. Thomas 
says, 
It is after this fashion that all natural things are inclined 
to what is suitable for them, having within themselves some prin-
ciple of their inclination in virtue of which that inclination is 
natural, so that in a way they go themselves and are not merely 
led to their due ends. Things moved by violenc~ ace only led, be-
cause they contribute nothing to the mover. But natural things go 
to their ends inasmuch as they cooperate with the one4~clining and 
directing them through a principle implanted in them. 
45 De Veritate, XXV, lc; cf. XXIII, lc. Here we are obviously 
thinking of natUral appetite in the sense that St. Thomas uses this te~ 
as embracing the inclinations of all natural forms, physical or mineral, 
vegetative, sensory, and rational or intellectual, both 8ub&tantial and ac-
cidental. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the substance is the ground of its ac-
cidental forms, of its powers and operations, the inclinations follYJing 
from these accidental forms, powers, operations follow from thet by which 
the substance is made a that-Which-is, namely, from the substantial form. 
Thus are all the natural inclinations ultimately grounded in the substan-
tial fO~t even though they are manifest through accidental fo~s. For the 
four senses in which St. Thomas uses the te~ natural appetite see Richard 
R. Baker's !!!! Thomistic Theory E! !h! Passions ~ Their Influence Upon 
~~, published doctoral dissertation; University of Notre Dame, 1941, 
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edward Brothers, Inc., 1941), 6-12. 
46 !.!., I, 78~ 1, ad3. 
47 Q! Veritate, XXV, lc. 
48 ~., XXII, lc; !.!., It 82, lc. 
26 
Thusly understood, natural appetite is, as Richard Baker says, 
not a distinct power or faculty of the agent, but it is identical 
with the nature itself. In other words, there is not a real, but 
only a virtual distinction (rationis ratiocinatae) between the na-
ture or form and its natural appetite. Nature and natural appetite 
are merely two aspects of the same thing, whereby we view a being 
atatically and dynamically. Hence, the terms ultimately point to 
the same reality, in as much as every nature, by the fact that it 
is a nature, is inclined to itself as a good and to other things 
as good for it. A natural appetite is nothing more than a nature's 
consubstantial love for that which perfects it •••• 49 
Natural appetite expresses the fact that every one of the beings of our 
experience is tending to perfect itself, is tending to its good in virtue 
of an intrinsic principle which is its very nature. 50 
From this it follows that there will be as many kinds of natural 
appetites as there are naturel. Non-living, living, sentient, and intel-
lectual substances all have natural appetites proportionate to their na-
49 1h! Thomistic Theory, 13-14. 
50 Recall that St. Thomas follows Aristotle when speaking of 
the individual being's nature. On this point see Gustaf J. Gustafson's 
~ Theory of Natural AppetencY~!h! Philosophy £!]!. Thomas, published 
doctoral dissertation; Catholic University of America, 1944, @ashington: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1944) 51. Gustafson refers to 
the Summa Theologiae, III, 2, Ie, where Aquinas makes his own the opinion 
of Aristotle (PhYSics, II, I, 192b 22) that nature is a "principle of mo-
tion (or change) in that which is per.!! and not per accidens." This no-
tion can be seen operating in one of St. Thomas' earlier works where, com-
menting on Aristotle's statement that "every substance is a nature" (Meta-
physics, V, 4,1014b 35), St. Thomas says that "the word nature, taken in 
this sense seems to signify the essence of a thing inasmuch as it is re-
lated to the thing's proper activity, since nothing lacks its proper activ-
ity." De Ente et Essentie, trans. Claire C. Riedl (rev. ed.: Toronto, 
Canada:--St:iMiChael's College, 1937), Chapter I, 15. 
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tures. If appetite expresses the relationship that a substance has to 
that which perfects it, to its good stmply speaking, and if it also expres-
ses the active tending toward this perfection,5l which activity has as its 
source and intrinsic prinCiple of the substance, namely its nature viewed 
as a dynamic principle (a necessary consequence of an !!!! that is and yet 
is not the all of actuality), then non-living substances perfect themselves 
in a non-living way by tending to that which perfects in virtue of their 
natural appetite. And intellectual or rational substances perfect them-
selves accordingly in virtue of thair particular kind of natural appetite, 
because they ~ the kind of thing that they!!!. So it is with all the 
beings of our experience. Being the kinds of beings they!!!, they tend to 
perfect themselves accordingly. 
Now the beings of experience actually fall into four great clas-
sese There a~e the purely natural, the living, the sensitive, and the in-
tel1ectua1 or ~ational natures. What sets off the latter two classes fram 
the purely natural substances is the fact that these beings are such that 
5') . 
they have in addition - to their natural forms the forms that they acquire 
51 As to whether natural appetite is prtmArily a relation or a 
movement or both see Gustaf Gustafson, The Theory ~ Natural Appetency, 68 
-78; Bernard James Diggs, b2!! ~ Being: An Investigation ~ the ~­
physics of ~. Thomas Aquinas, (New York: S.F. Vanni, 1947), 30, 31, 135; 
and finally, see William O'Connor's "Natural Appetite," The Thamist, XVI, 
(1963), 361-409. ---
52 Perhaps it would be better to say that same substances have 
"as a part of their natural form" or "obtain as following from their natu-
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through apprehension. St. Thomas expresses this when he says, "But in 
those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own na-
tural being by its own natural form, but in such a manner that it is re-
ceptive of the species of other things."s3 
Aquinas proceeds to classify apprehension into two basic kinds. 
Some creatures perform acts of sense apprehension while others perform, in 
addition, acts of intellectual apprehension. These are two radically dif-
ferent acts as can be seen from the difference of their objects. Whereas 
the object of sense apprehension is the species of sensible things, for 
example this or that colored thing, the object of intellectual apprehension 
is the species of intelligible things, the very nature of color. 54 The 
tmportant fact that must not be lost sight of is that in the act of appre-
hension the subject acquires !h! !2!! of the apprehended thing. To know 
is to become and be the other as the other. 
Aquinas began with the principle that some inclination follows 
every form: from the natural form follows a natural inclination, and from 
ral form" since the powers and operations of the substance are g:ounded in 
the substance's natural form: "Every power tends to its object by a na-
tural appetite." De Veritate, XXII, 3, ad3; cf. also S.T., I, 80, lc. Thus 
the power of apprehension lies within the natural form-of the apprehending 
substance even though the apprehended form is itself an acquired form that 
is intentionally united with the apprehended subject. 
53 !.!., I, 80, lc. 
54 De Veritate, XXV, lc; also see X, 6, ad2; S.C.G., IV, llc; 
II t 66c: "Moreover, sense is cognizant only of singular'S ; -for every sense 
power knows through individual species, since it receives the species of 
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the apprehended fonns follow corresponding inclinations. 
Just as in those things that have knowledge forms exist in a 
higher manner and above the manner of natural forms, so there 
must be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclina-
tion •••• And this superior inclination belongs to be appetitive 
power of the soul, through which the anbnal is able to desire 
what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined 
by its natural form. 55 
He then proceeds to divide these superior inclinations according to the 
active principle from which they arise. 
Since these inclinations arise as a consequence of apprehension 
and since appetite is the actual striving to effect a relationship in the 
real order of existence, Aquinas calls appetite a passive power. It is 
"passive" inasmuch as it is put into act by the object of apprehension, 
and it is a "power" inasmuch as it is the efficient cause of the movement 
that seeks to bring about a real relationship in the existential order be-
tween the subject and its object. 
From the point of view of their "passivity," the appetitive pow-
ers, like all passive powers, are distinguished according to their objects 
which are their active and movable principles. For 
the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active 
to the passive. Indeed, the passive power itself has its very 
things in bodily organs. But the intellect is cognizant of universals, as 
experience proves." 
55 ~.!., It 80, Ie. 
56 
nature from its relation to its active principle. 
Again, 
30 
The movement of the appetive part arises somehow from apprehen-
sion, because every operation of a passive principle takes its 
origin from an active principle. Now appetite is a passive 
power, because it is moved by the object of the appetite, which 
is an 'unmoved mover' a~ is said in 1h! ~ LAristotle's Q! 
anima, III (433b 15-181/. But the object of ap~'titive does 
not move the appetite unless it is apprehended. 
Therefore since what is apprehended by the senses is 11 generically" dif-
ferent 58 from what is apprehended by the intellect, it follows that sense 
sq 
appetite is "generically" distinct from intellectual appetite. . 
There is, therefore, in addition to natural appetite, appetites 
that arise in conjunction with the forms acquired through apprebension. 
From sense apprehension comes sense appetite which in man Aquinas calls 
60 
"sensuality." The genus of sense appetite is in turn divided into the 
irascible and concupiscible powers. 61 And from intellectual apprehension 
56 ~., I, 80, 2c. 
57 Q! Veritate, XXV, leo 
58 ~.1., I. 80, 2c. It is interesting that in the Q! Veritate, 
XXV, lc, Aquinas refers to this as a "specific difference." 
59 See Chapter I, pages 28-29, note 54. 
60 ~.!., I, 80, lc; Q! Veritate, XXV, lc. 
61 Q! Veritaee, XXIV, aa. 2-3c; Quaestiones Disputatae de Antma, 
art. 13. 
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comes intellectual appetite called "will.,,62 
It appears that Aquinas offers another basis for his classifica-
tion of the genus of appetite. St. Thomas says that 
rational appetite is distinguished from that of sense in just the 
same way as sensitive appetite is distinguished from that of na-
ture--because of a more perfect way of tending •••• Hence the nearer 
a nature is to God, the less it is63nclined by another and the more it is capable of incliniug itself. 
Here the emphasis is placed on the fact that appetite or inclination is 
~aGically a principle of movement. It is this fact that enables Aristotle 
and Aquinas to refer to appetite as a "passive power." When one considers 
the "passivity" of this power one naturally divides the genus of appetite 
according to the activ~ principles to which th:f.s passi.vity is directed. We 
have seen that such a consideration led Aquinas to classify the "superior 
inclinations" according to the objects of apprehension. But when one con-
siders appetite as a principle of movement, the basis of classification be-
comes appetite under the aspect of "power. 1I 
Under this latter consideration St. Thomas proceeds to divide 
the genus of appetite according to the natures in which the appetite is 
found. By reason of its materiality, insensible nature "is inclined to an 
end, to be sure, but has within it nothing which inclines but only a prin-
62 For other passages where Aquinas can be observed dividing the 
genus of appetite into natural, sense, and intellectual appetites see S.T., 
I, 80, lc; I, 59, lc; I-II, 6, aa. l-lcj S.C.G., II, 47c; III, 26c; De-Ver-
itate, XXII, 4c; XXIII, lc; XXV, le. - - - -- ---
63 Q! Veritate, XXII, 4c. 
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ciple of inclination.1l64 Thus while inanimate beings are moved, "and 
65 
though one can move another, still no one of them can move itself." 
Sensitive natures are more perfect as can be seen from the fact that they 
have within themselves an interior principle of inclination, a principle 
of self motion. But theirs is not the most perfect of natures nor is 
theirs the most perfect kind of tendency of appetite: 
Yet this inclination is not within the control of the an~al which 
is inclined but is determined by something else. An an Una 1 is not 
able at the sight of something attractive not to crave it, because 
animals do not themselves have the mastery over their own inclina~ 
tion.66 
Finally, there are those creatures who hwve a rational nature 
which~ 
bein6 closest to God not merely, like inan~ate things, has an 
inclination to something, and, like a sentient nature, a mover 
of this inclination dete~ined as it were extrinsically, but fur-
ther so has its inclination within its own power that it does not 
necessarily incline to anything appetible which is apprehended, 
but can incline or not incline. And so its inclination is not 
determined for it by anything else but by itself. 67 
64 ~. 
65 Ibid., a.3. 
66 Ibid., a.4; see also a.3. 
67 Ibid., a.4; see also a.3. For similar classifications of 
the genus of appetite under this aspect of power see !.f.Q., III. lc; III, 
73c; II, 47c; ~ Veritate, XXII, 3c. 
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SUMMARY 
This chapter began by noting that the beings of our direct ex-
perience are the very opposite of static. Beings manifest themselves ac-
tively, which is to say that they are dynamic. Their activity may involve 
a passage from the state of potentiality to a state of actuality which is 
change in the strict sense of the term. Or it may take the form of an ac-
tivity which as an activity does not itself involve change (for example, 
the activity of knowing) but which may indeed need to be pteceeded by a 
change (for example, the activity of coming to know). Whatever form it 
takes, activity seems to be a baSic element given in the data of experience. 
The phileeopher's question is not, then, a question of fact. But rather 
given this fact, the question is what is its ratio? What can be known 
about beings that are dynamic, that act, that even undergo change? 
For St. Thomas the activity and change manifest by individual be-
ings is a Sign of their imperfection and incompletion. But it also pOints 
to the fact that these beings are actively seeking their end which is their 
good absolutely speaking, and,this for them is to seek to expand their ex-
istence, to become more than they are. Bernard Diggs expresses what seems 
to be the authentic thought of St. Thomas in a passage which, because of 
the clarity of its expression, shall be quoted in full: 
By its existence, the thing is actual, and thus perfect accord-
ing to the measure of itself; it is lacking in nothing according 
to its own substantial nature. By the very fact that it is, it 
has gained the first step towards completeness. And by having 
this kind of existence, b ~i~';i~~irst perfection, it is 
~2/\)«·· . 
I '" L 
Ul-,; ,.,. 
34 
able to express a goodness and perfect others. Through its own 
act of existing it has the capacity to attract others, to promise 
additional being. And in the stmplicity of its existence, it 
stands ready to act and communicate its perfection. Its activity, 
in following on its existence, expresses that perfection which it 
has, and extends perfection to any other which has the capacity to 
receive it. And although this perfection is ltmited by the thing's 
own substantial nature, nevertheless it does not rest in the lbni-
tation. For by existing it has an inclination to become a greater 
thing, to spring beyond the limits of its substantial perfection and 
take more existence to itself. In this way the thing gains a com-
pleted perfection; in feeding on the existence of others it passes 
beyond its narrowness, and becomes fully developed. By completing 
its being it becomes good stmply, good in every way that it can be-
come good. And with this completion its activity is transformed 
and increased. The completing of its existence completes its per-
fective power. Thus by gaining additional existence a thing gains 
additional perfection.68 
How do beings acquire this perfection, this completion? They 
tend to it by an inclination that follows their natural forms, (natural ap-
petite) and in the case of beings of a higher and more perfect kind of na-
ture by an inclination which follows upon the forms acquired through sense 
apprehension (sense appetite), or through intellectual apprehension (intel-
lectual appetite). 
In short, beings tend to perfect themselves according to ~ 
they are and, to be sure, precisely inasmuch as they!!!. Now it is the 
thesis of this writer that moral existence is the state of perfection as-
cribed by St. Thomas to one kind of being of our immediate experience. Men, 
that is rational beings, being what they are tend to perfect themselves 
68 l&!! ~ Being, 73-74; cf. 88. 
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accordingly. Their completion in the line of existence is specifically 
proportioned to their first act of being--their substantiality. When men 
act we say that they are morally good or evil, which is but to recognize 
the special character attached to the acts of rational beings. This takes 
us to the next chapter which will investigate in what precisely lies the 
significance of the proposition that certain of man's acts bring man to 
exist in the moral order, in the order of perfection properly ascribed to 
rational beings. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE HUMAN ACT 
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to sketch St. 
Thomas Aquinas' explanation of the fact of activity on whatever level it 
is observed. It was seen that beings act because they are seeking to c~ 
plete themselves. They are actively seeking their final end which is their 
absolute good and second perfection. They are, in short, seeking to per-
fect themselves since they are cut off, so to speak, from their end which 
is perfective. In the present chapter attention is focused on the activ-
ities of rational beings, that is men. They too are seeking their comple-
tion, a completion proportioned to their being. But in seeking this com-
pletion they perfom acts which are properly termed "moral." The purpose 
of this chapter i8 to investigate the reality and prtmarily the causality 
operative when human beings begin to acquire their second perfection and 
absolute good, which for them involves beginning to exist morally. 
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It is natural to refer to certain of men's actions and thus to 
the men whose actions they are as being good or evil. One is constantly 
classifying the acts of individual men as being good and worthy of praise 
or evil and worthy of blame. Indeed, few things seem more natural or more 
common than the oft pronounced moral judgments. It seems correct to say 
that by these judgments nothing less is meant than that the individual is 
really, that is existentially, existing either goodly or evilly, and that 
every such act is an act of coming into being, namely the being of moral 
existence. The explication of moral judgments is 80 existential, in fact, 
that not only is the evil man blamed, he is often punished and sometimes 
must forfeit his life. 
Again, the question is not one of fact; rather, the philosopher's 
task is to give the ultimate explanation of this fact. His task is to ren-
der it intelligible by exposing its causes, its ultimate causes. Now the 
fact is that men manifest themselves morally, that is as existing goodly 
or evilly, and thus the philosopher's search is for those causes which 
adequately account for the individual's coming into being in the line of 
moral existence. In short, the question he must answer is what are the 
causes that are operative when a man begins to exist morally. Since this 
is a real existence and a real becoming, there are real causes. 
In presenting the thought of St. Thomas concerning the causes of 
moral existence, one can begin by examining his notion of a moral act. In 
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the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas says that the human act is properly called 
the moral act. l This isolated passage is not much help of itself, serving 
as it does as a nominal definition. It but identifies human acts with 
moral acts and leaves the problem of specifying the constituents of the 
human act. However, earlier in this work Thomas had already stated quite 
clearly, if briefly, in what consists "human acts." There one finds the 
celebrated passage wherein he distinguishes human acts from acts of man: 
Of actions done by man those alone are properly called human, 
which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational 
animals in thiS, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore 
those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is 
master. Now man is master of his own actions through his rea-
son and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as the fac-
ulty ~~ ~ reason. Therefore those actions are properly 
called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any 
other actions are found in man, they can be called actions of 
man but2not properly human actions, since they are not proper to man. 
In other words, only the actions of which man is the master can be said to 
be moral acts. While other aots performed by men are real acts, indeed 
they are as real as the moral acts, yet they are not called moral. Only 
acts performed knowingly and willingly are properly designated as moral 
acts. And thus only by performing such acts does the individual begin to 
exist morally, for inasmuch as man is the subject of his acts he is hUD-
1 !.!., I-II, 18, 9c; cf. I-II, 18, Sc. 
2 S.T., I-II, 1, lc, in the literal translation by the Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province, (2nd ed.: New York; London: Burns 
Oates & Washbourne, LTD, 1927), Vol. 6, 2-3; cf. ~ I Ethicorum ad Nicoma-
chum, lect. 1, 1-3. 
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self said to exist morally. 
Relating St. Thomas' identification of moral and human acts to 
what we saw in Chapter I is his general doctrine of creaturely activity, 
some Unportant conclusions are seen to follow. First, since men are them-
selves a part of nature, they no less than the other kinds of beings mani-
fest themselves actively becausa they are cut off from their end. They 
exist, and yet their existence is not all that it could be. Men act the 
way they do because they have not yet attained their complete good which 
is their final and complete perfection. They act because desiring those 
things which appear as good they seek to attain a relationship with them 
in the real order. Second, by their activity men manifest themselves as 
a radically different kind of being. They act, to be sure; but while sUn-
ilar in many respects to the activities of non-men, their activities are, 
nevertheless, strikingly different. The prUnary difference, as St. Thomas 
notes, is the fact that men act kno~Jingly and willingly. Men seek to com-
plete themselves, but they go about their task rationally and with a prin-
ciple of inclination that is proportioned to their nature; that is, men 
tend to their end with a rational appetite which is their will. The con-
sequence of this fact is equally experiential and takes the form of moral 
judgments. Recognizing the human situation, if at times but vaguely and 
even confusedly, we quite readily attribute a special quality to character-
istically human activities: acts performed knowingly and willingly, that 
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is, human acts properly so called, are judged to be either really morally 
good or really morally evil. And so St. Thomas says that human acts are 
moral acts. This means that inclining to one's final end and ultimate 
good and perfection in a humanly way essentially and necessarily involves 
moral existence, be it good or evil. More will be said about this later. 
NATURE OF MORAL EXISTENCE- -MORAL GOOD AND EVIL 
Presently, something should be said about the nature of moral 
existence before we undertake an investigation of its causes. Human ac-
tivities are judged to be either morally good or morally evil. This is, 
as we have said, a starting point grounded in experience. Good and evil 
appear as categories into which moral acts are placed because human beings 
manifest themselves as existing either goodly or evilly. What does the 
philosopher make of this classification of human acts? In answering this 
question St. Thomas observes that the good and evil in human acts, in 
other words moral being, is in some ways not different from good and evil 
in non-human activity.3 St. Thomas uses the analogy not to deduce moral 
being from an analysis of the physical or natural beings of things, but 
because there maintains a real 8~ilarity between them. One would not be 
at a disadvantage then were he to begin with Aquinas' discussion of the 
good and evil in things in general. From there it is but a short step to 
3 !.!., I-II, 18, Ie. 
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Saint Thomas' doctrine of moral being. 
The Nature Of Good And !!!! In Things ~ General 
Briefly then, let us recall that anything in so far a.c: it exists 
is actual and therefore good. 4 And yet something is not for that reason 
necessarily good absolutely speaking, for, as was noted, the beings of our 
experience manifest themselves as being cut off from their end, their ab-
solute good and second perfection. The question of good and evil ultimate-
ly reduces itself to a question of the being, the individual having at-
tained at any given moment the level of perfection that it could and should 
possess. To the extent that it has attained this degree of perfection and 
actuality it is good, and to the extent that it falls short it is evil. 
Now it is this state of being cut off from their end which allows for the 
possibility of good and evil as we know them. 
As for the nature of the goodness manifest by the beings of our 
experience something has already been said. Convertible with being, the 
good, or, if you will, the goodness of the beings of our experience, is 
nought but their very being understood as related to the appetite, that is, 
viewed as desirable. At this point the problem is not understanding the 
nature of their goodness. As was indicated in the previous chapter,S an 
4 See Chapter I, page 9, note 15. 
S Ibid. 
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individual has just as much good as it has being. The metaphysical problem 
now is given the convertibility of being and good, wherein lies the reality 
of evil. How can there be evil when everything which in any way ~ is 
necessarily good? 
It is right that a discussion on evil should develop after or at 
least within a discussion of good, for it is the essellce of the matter that 
a privltive opposite be known only in the light of its positive counter-
part. 6 Ontologically posterior, evil is a180 logically posterior to the 
good. And so Aquinas says, "One opposite is known through the other, as 
darkness is known through light. Hence, what evil is must be known from 
~ 
the nature of good. 1I7 The discussion of evil is therefore intimately con-
nected with the good for, paradoxical as it appears at first sight, it is 
only the good which can and does reveal evil. 
Aquinas observes that evil signifies the absence of some good. 8 
6 De Potentia Q!,!, 9, 7, ad6. flIndeed negation or privation 
cannot be the first that is conceived by the intellect since what is ne-
gated or deprived is always needed for the understanding of the negation 
or privation." As translated by Vernon J. Bourke in his !he Pocket Aquinas, 
(Washington: The Washington Square Press Inc., 1960), 160. 
7 S.T., I, 48, lc; also see S.T., I, 14, 10, ad4: "To know a 
thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing 
is knowable in itself; but evil is not knowable in itself because the very 
nature of evil consists in the privation of good; therefore evil can nei-
ther be cleZined no!' known except by good." 
8 S.T., I, 48, lc; cf. also I, 14, 10, ad4; De Malo, 1, lc: 
"Evil preCisely-as such is not a reality in things, but. deprivation of 
some particular good inhering in a particular good." 
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And since being and good are convertible, the absence of good which is 
meant by evil is an absence of being, of existence. Taken in itself evil 
is simply non-being. "That which has no being at all is neither good nor 
evil. And, as we have shown, whatever is, so far as it is, is good. Hence, 
a thing must be evil so far as it is a non-being.,,9 But how can evil be a 
non-being if it is so very real? St. Thomas answers by observing that of 
the 'kinds' of non-being, evil is properly said to be privation, and thus 
it should not be confused with mere negation on the one hand, nor with mat-
ter on the other, both of which are also said to be a kind of non-being. 10 
Rather, evil is, as was said, a privation: 
As the term "good" signifies perfect being, so the term "evil" 
signifies nothing else than privation of a perfect being. In 
its proper acceptation, privation is predicated of that which 
is fitted by its nature to be possessed, and to be poseesed at 
a certain time in a certain manner. Evidently, therefore a 
thing is called evil if it lacks a perfection it ought to have. ll 
Every evil is a certain lack of being, and therefore evil can also be said 
9 S.C.G., II, 4lc; "What is more, if every being, as such, is 
good, then evIl"; as such, is a non .. being." ~. 
10 ~ XII Metaphysics, sect. 1; see Sister Mary De Coursey, 
S.C.L., The Theory of .!!!! .!!! !h! Metaphysics .2!~. Thomas ~ .lli Q2!!-
temporary Significance, published doctoral dissertation; Catholic Univer-
sity of America, 1948, (washington: Catholic University of America Press, 
194$, 32-35. For the relationship between matter, negation and privation 
see also St. Thomas' !!! Principiis Naturae. 
11 Compendium Theo10giae, I, 114; cf. also !.!., I, 33, ad2: 
"In a third sense, privation means the absence of that which something 
oUght to have; in which sense, privation signifies an imperfection." 
, 
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to be a negation. However, not every negation is a privation, nor there-
fore is every negation an evil. Only when the negation is said of some 
perfection which should be present is it said to be a privation and an 
evil in the proper sense of the word. 12 Evil is, then, a negation or non-
being in a substance which ought not to have such a lack. The example St. 
Thomas often uses when speaking of the privitive aspect characteristic of 
evil is that of the blind man: "Thus if a man lacks the sense of Sight, 
this is an evil for h~. But the same lack is not an evil for a stone, 
for the stone is not equipped by nature to have the faculty of Sight.,,13 
Here then is the reality of evil, its essence, that "it is the privation 
of the good.,,14 
Taken in itself evil is nothing. It is therefore wrong to look 
for its essence as if evil were something in itself. 
In fact, evil is simply a privation of something which a subject 
is entitled by its origin to possess and which it ought to have, 
as we have said. Such is the meaning of the word "evil" among 
all men. Now privation is not an essence; it 1s, rather, fsne-
gation in a substance. Therefore, evil is not an essence. 
Navertheless, evil is present in some subject; and since anything is good 
inasmuch as it exists, the subject of evil is some good: 
12 See ~.l'J I, 48, 3c; ~.£.Q., III, 6c. 
13 Compendium Theologiae, I, 114; cf. ~.l., I, 48, 3c. 
14 j.l., It 14, lOco Underlining is mine. 
15 j.£.Q't III, 7c. 
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Indeed, evil cannot exist by itself, since it has no essence •••• 
Therefore, evil must be in some subject. Now, every subject, be-
cause it is some sort of substance is a good of some kind, as is 
clear from the foregoing. So every evil is in a good thing. 16 
Not every good is necessarily the subject of evil, however. Evil's sub-
ject must be a good which has some potentiality,l7 and thus the highest 
good Who is pure act could not possibly be the subject of evil. 18 What 
then is the reality of evil? Evil is nothing more nor less than the lack 
of perfection that an existing Bubstance could and should have. Inasmuch 
as a substance exists it is good and therefore perfect; but inasmuch as it 
is cut off from the perfection which it could and should have it is evil. 
Evil is possible because beings are posited into existence as substances 
cut off from their final perfection, and in this sense they are in poten-
tiality to that perfection: 
Therefore the subject of evil must be good, not in the sense 
that,it is opposed to evil, but in the sense that it is a po-
tency for the reception of evil. This brings out the fact 
that not every good can be the subject of evil, but only such 
a good as is in potency with respect to some perfection of which 
it can be deprived. l9 
From this it follows that it is not incorrect to maintain that 
16 ~., III, 11c; !.1., I, 48, 3c. 
17 !.1., I, 48, 3c. 
18 ~., I, 49, 3, adZ. 
19 Compendium Theo1ogiae, I, 117c. 
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the beings of our experience are divided into good and evil, if ~ne retains 
the proper meaning of these terms. Every thing is good ins8much as it has 
being, inasmuch as it exists. A substance is evil, and really so, only 
inasmuch as its being, its existence falls short of the level cf perfection 
that is due to it. 20 Evil is thus most real, as the blind man well knows. 
But its reality is precisely that lack of being without which the individ-
ual is not properly what it should be. In this sense evil is most imper-
fect. It is, in truth, the very opposite of perfection; evil is,~ itself, 
non-being pure and simple. And since substances manifest themselves as 
lacking the being that is properly due to them, they manifest themselves 
as both good and evil. They are neither totally good nor tetally evil; 
but, rather they are somewhat good and somewhat evil. The division of be-
ings into good and evil is but the intelligible rendering of this fact. 
Kinds of .§!ll 
The experience of evil--like that of good--contains a unifying 
element. l~en one attempts to classify the various kinds of evil, for 
example, the evils of corruption, death, sickness, loss of an organ or 
power, etc., one discovers that these privations relate either to the op-
eration of a being or to the very being itself. For this reason St. Thomas 
says, 
20 !.1., I-II, 18, lc; I-II, 18, Sc, and adi. 
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Evil, as was said above, is the privation of good, which chiefly 
and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act, however is 
twofold, first, and second. The first act is the form and in-
tegrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore 
evil is also twofold. In one way it occurs by the abstraction 
of the form, or of any part required for the integrity of the 
thing, as blindness is an evil, just as it is an evil to be want-
ing in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the 
withdrawl of the due operation, either because it does not eXist, 
or because it has not its due mode and order. 21 
From this basic distinction St. Thomas notes three kinds of evil. Depend-
ing on whether the above mentioned evils occur in irrational or rational 
beings, St. Thomas says that evil is divided into the evil of nature, of 
punishment (poena),22 and of fault. When these evils (the privation~and 
that is either of the first or second perfection) are present j.n irrational 
beings St. Thomas calls them evils of nature (agens natural~ and says that 
these are ultimately reduced to an evil in the agent or in Lhe matter upon 
21 Ibid., I, 48, 5c; also see De Malo, 1, 4c; S.C.G., III, 6 up 
to and including St. Thomas' reply to thesecond argument-of chapter 5; III. 
14c. 
22 S.T., I. L.8, 5c. Whereas Anton Pegis and "The Fathers of the 
English Dominican Providence" in their translations of the Summa Theo10gica 
translate "Poena" as "Pain~' the former in order to indicate the ambiguity 
of this translation includes the latin word "poena" in brackets while the 
latter footnotes the translation and gives this notation: "Pain here means 
penalty: such was its original signification, being derived from poena. In 
this sense we say Pain of death, Pain of loss, Pain of sense.--Ed." How-
ever, it appears that "punishment" is a more accurate translation of 
"poena," since when Aquinas uses the term "poena" either alone or in con-
junction with another term he means it to signify primarily a type of pun-
ishment. Viz. R.J. Deferrari, I. Barry, and I. Mcguiness' list of the 
"kinds of poena" appearing in St. Thomas' works. Every "kind" of usage in 
their list (some 35 in all) has a direct reference to punishment of some 
kind: A Lexicon .2! g. Thomas Aguinas Based .2!! !h!. Summa Theologica and 
Selected Passages, (Washington, 1948-1953). 
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which the agent acts. When the privation is in a rational being it takes 
on a special character due to the fact that it occurs in a being capable 
of intellectual knowledge and volition. On this basis evil is properly 
called either the evil of punishment (poena) or of fault (culpa). St. 
Thomas continues, 
But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil which 
is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational 
creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which comes 
from the withdrawl of the form and integrity of the thing has 
the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition that 
all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was 
shown above. For it is of the nature of pain to be against the 
will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due 
operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for it 
is ~puted anyone as a fault if he should fail2fs regards per-
fect action, of which he is master by the will. 
The beings of our experience thus fall into the category of good 
or evil, and depending on whether the being is capable of rational know-
ledge and volition, its evil state can be further specified. If a being 
has the perfection it ought to have it is said to be naturally good, while 
to lack this perfection is to suffer a natural evil. Rational beings are 
also said to be good or evil. But since the achievement of their proper 
perfection is somehow dependent on their intellect and will, they are said 
to be morally good or morally evil. Moral evil is in turn more properly 
23 !.!., I, 49, lc; and ad3; cf. !.f.Q., III, lOco 
24 !.! .• I, 48, 5c; cf. !!~, I, 4c. 
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called evil of fault since, as we shall shortly see, the causes of this 
evil, of this state of non-being, is the freely choosing subject himself. 
MORAL GOOD AND EVIL 
Now the genus of moral acts and consequently the genus of moral 
existence is divided into the species of moral good and moral evil. St. 
Thomas says, "Now certain actions are called human or moral inasmuch as 
they proceed from reason. 25 Consequently it is evident that good and evil 
diversify the species on human actions: since essential differences cause 
a difference of speciesl~6 Every human act inasmuch as it is performed 
knowingly and willingly is therefore a moral act and is properly classified 
as either morally good or eVil,27 which is but to explicate Aquinas' iden-
tification of human and moral acts. 
To say that every human act can be placed in the species of 
moral good or moral evil is not, however, to specify in what lies the good-
ness or evilness of moral activity. In answer to the question of whether 
all human actions are good St. Thomas says: 
We must speak of good and evil in actions as good and evil in 
25 The good of man is to be in accord with reason, for the stanO-
ard in moral matters is reason: S.C.G., III, 9cj cf. also III, lOc; ~.!., 
I. 63c and ad4; and I-II, 18, lc.- - -
26 S.T., I-II, 18, 5c, in the translation of the Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province, see also ~.!., I, 48, 1, ad2. 
27 Ibid., I-II, 18, 9c. 
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things, because such as everything is, such is the act that it 
produces. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
We must therefore say that every action has goodness in so 
far as it has being, whereas it is lacking in goodness in so far 
as it is lacking something that is due to its fullness of being; 
and thus it is said to be evil, for instance, if it lacks the 
measure dete~ined by reason, or its place, or something of the 
kind. 28 
The goodness or evilness of moral activity and moral existence is conse-
quently not different, ontological1y speaking. from the goodness or evil-
ness of things. A thing is good if it has the being, the actuality, the 
perfection that is due to it and evil to the extent that these are lacking, 
and this is true even regards the being of human acts: a man is good if 
he has the being, the actuality, the perfection that is due to him, while 
he is evil to the extent that his being falls short of this his end. 
In brief then. every human act is either morally good or morally 
evil, depending on whether or not it is directed to a due end in accord 
with reason. It is only by perfo~ing human acts that the individual be-
gins to exist morally, for inasmuch as man is the subject of his acts the 
man is himself said to exist morally. Thus our investigation has been 
given direction. Moral acts are human acts, that is acts performed know-
ingly and willingly. The causes of moral existence should therefore some-
28 ~., 18, lc. 
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how include the faculties of knowing and willing. Let us now turn to the 
causes of moral existence. 
CAUSES OF MORAL EXISTENCE 
Aristotle reduces the causes to four in number: material, for-
mal, moving, and final. St. Thomas follows Aristotle's division with the 
tmportant modifications that he interprets the moving cause as an efficient 
cause29 and that he does not base his division on the prior distinction of 
intrinsic and extrinsic causal princip1es. 30 Now the material cause is for 
St. Thomas as for Aristotle "that from which a thing comes to be and is 
'something intrinsic,' Le., something ~.zhich exists within a thing.,,3l 
Pr1me matter is such a cause. It ie the nature of prtme matter to stand as 
the recipient of the formal cau.e and thereby constitute the completed ma-
terial substance. The formal cause received into prtme matter, the sub-
stantial form, is the intrinsic "form and pattern of a thing" from which 
29 Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy, 184-189. 
30 Francis X. Meehan, Efficient Causality.!:!! Aristotle and .§!. 
Thomas, published doctoral dissertation; The Catholic University of Ameri-
ca, 1940,(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1940), 
179, n.40; 205. 
31 In V Metaphysics, lect. 2, 763. Translation is taken from 
John P. Rowan's §!.:. l'hOl48.S Aguinajj: Commentary.2!'!.t:!:!! MetaphYG ics of 
Aris~otle, 2 Volumes, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1961). Unless other-
wise noted, translations from St. Thomas' commentary will be taken from 
Rowan's translation. 
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"each thing derives its nature.,,32 
When speaking of efficient causality St. Thomas often follows 
Aristotle even to the extent of interchanging efficient and moving caus-
ality as 1f the two were simply convertible terms. Thus in his commentary 
on the Metaphysics St. Thomas says» "In a third sense cause means that 
from which the first beginning of change or of rest comes, i.e., a moving 
or efficient cause.,,33 Fr. Meehan,34 like Gilson,35 warns against misin-
terpreting St. Thomas' mind on this point, and refers his readers to the 
passages where St. Thomas speaks of God's creative act which is"that most 
obvious example of efficient causality par excellence which excludes mo-
tion, time and succession.,,36 If not simply a moving cause» what then is 
the nature of efficient causality? In the words of Fr. Meehan, "An effi-
cient cause then is the productive cause or an acting cause; a cause which, 
by action, contributes being to or to the being or becoming of another.,,37 
32 Ibid., 764. This differs, of course, from the extrinsic 
formal cause ~ is, for St. Thomas, the exemplary cause. Ibid; see 
also J!! Veritate, III, 84. 1 and 3c. --
33 ~., 765. 
34 Efficient Causality !a Aristotle ~~. Thomas, 184-189. 
35 Elements of Christian Philosophy, 184-202. 
36 See, for example, ~.Q.Q., II, 2lc. 
37 Efficient Causality !a Aristotle ~ St. Thomas, 187-188; 
see also 199-328, esp. 308ff, where Fr. Meehan developes these notions. 
For a more recent study of the role of efficient ~ausality in St. Thomas' 
53 
The fourth kind of cause is the final cause. In this sense 
cause means Ita thing's end, i.e., that for the sake of which something is 
done •••• ,,38 The importance of this cause lies in that while it. is the last 
thing to come into being it is always prior in causality. The efficient 
cause is the causality of both matter and form, "because by its motion it 
causes matter to be receptive of form and makes form exist in matter.,,39 
In a real sense it is also the cause of the final cause inasmuch as the end 
is not realized save through the agency of efficient causality. Yet the 
final cause is the cause of the efficient cause, "inasnlUch as it is the 
reason for the causality of the efficient cause. For an efficient cause 
is a cause inasmuch as it acts, and it acts only because of the final 
cause. 1I40 Last in the order of execution, the final cause is first in the 
order of the agent's intention. "And it is this way that it is a cause."41 
These then are the four species of causality. Though baSically 
thought especially from the point of view of the relationship maintaining 
between creaturely efficient causality and God's causality see Joseph Mar-
tin Graham's Secondary Causal Influx According !2 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
unpublished doctoral diBsertation; University of Notre Dame, 1961. 
38 ~ V Metaphysics, lect. II, 771. 
39 ~., 1ect. III, 782. 
40 Ibid., 1ect. 11, 775. 
41 !.1., I-II, 1, I, 4d1. 
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distinct modes, they do have something in common. Fr. Meehan s1,Jl'llllJArizes 
the matter: 
• • .a cause, in the generic sense, according to the mind of St. 
Thomas, is that particular species of principle, which, by posi-
tive influx, contributes being to, or contributes to the being 
or becoming of, something distinct from itself and on which that 
other is dependent in the measure of that contribution.42 
These four causes are thus the principles that account for the being and 
becoming of the beings of our experience. 
It has been observed that moral existence is a real mode of 
existence. Individual men are said to become moral, to come to be morally, 
either goodly or evilly. And even though they may develop a habit of moral 
action, virtuous or viciOUS, it is generally admitted that good men can be-
gin to exist evilly and evil men goodly. The reality of this mode of being 
has also been examined, if but briefly, and it was seen that only human 
acts are moral acts, and therefore only by performing human acts does the 
subject enter into the order of morality by beginning to exist morally. 
Now since moral existence is a real state of being, and since indiVidual 
men are said to become, to come to exist in this state, it is proper and 
necessary in looking for the intelligible expression of this mode of being, 
to seek those causes which "by positive influxll contribute to this mode of 
existence. 
42 Efficient CausalitY!n Aristotle ~~. Thomas, 174. 
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Material Cause 
Is there a material cause of moral existence? Let us look a bit 
more closely at What Aquinas says about material causality. Besides prime 
matter, which is the potency to substantial existence and which is called 
the matter out-of-which the substance comes to be. St. Thomas recognizes 
another kind of material cause, namely, the existing substance itself which 
is in potency to be aCCidentally. This type is celled the matter in-which 
since an already informed matter, the existing substance, is subject to 
additional modifications43_-inasmuch as it is in potentiality to these ac-
cidental modifications. St. Thomas goes on to say that in a sense every-
thing that is in potency can be called matter. 44 It is clear that mate-
rial causality is an analogous notion for Aquinas, meaning as it does any-
thing from the purely passive potency of prime matter to "everything that. is 
ta .,way in potency." Taken in this latter and more general meaning the 
material cause of moral existence is the individual substance, the sup-
posit who is the subject of his human acts. The individual man who in sub-
sisting has achieved his first good and primary perfection is the subject 
of moral existence. When he performs human acts he is either achieving 
the ,good and perfection which he ought to possess. being the kind of being 
43 1!! Principiis Naturae. Translation is taken from Vernon J. 
Bourke's translation as found in his The Pocket Aquinas, 62; also see ]a 
V MetaphYSiCS, lect. II, 763. ---
44 Aid. 
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he is, namely a rational being, and is said to be existing morally, that 
is goodly, or he is achieving a good and a perfection but at the expense 
of the good and perfection he ought to possess, and he is said to be exist-
ing morally, that is evilly. But in either case, it is the individual him-
self who is the material cause of moral becoming and moral being. Since 
being and good are convertible, the material cause of moral being and be-
coming is a good--the subsistent. And so, when speaking of the causes of 
evil St. Thomas says that "the good is the cause of evil by way of the ma-
terial cause •••• For it was shown that good is the subject of evil.,,45 It 
hardly needs mentioning that the material cause of moral goodness is sim-
ilarly the subject and thus the good. The material cause of moral exist-
ence is, then, the individual subject who, inasmuch as he exists, is good. 
He is the material cause in that in performing human acts the subject ac-
quires additional reality, additional perfection through the acquisition 
of additional forms which are either good inasmuch as they are actually per-
fective of the subject as subject, or evil inasmuch as though coming to the 
subject as somewhat good they deprive the substance of the thing which is 
actually perfective--his real good. 
Having discovered the material cause of moral existence we are 
still left with a question. What causes the individual to begin to exist 
45 ~'!'J 1, 49, lc; cf. Compo Theol., 1, IISc. 
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goodly or evilly? What brings about this state of being? What, in short, 
causes the material cause to take on the unique, though not on that count 
unreal, quality of moral being? The key to this inquiry is found in the 
already observed identification of human and moral activity. Every human 
act is a moral act, and inasmuch as human acts are those performed knowing-
ly and willingly, moral acts spring from the powers of intellect and will. 
Are then the intellect and will causes of moral being? and if so, what is 
the mode of their causality? The answer to these questions obviously in-
volves an analysis of the components of the human act and therefore it is 
to this analyses that we now turn. 
Final Cause 
St. Thomas' description of the human act, found for the most 
part in questions 8 to 17 of the Prima Secundae, reveals a ~ather complex 
46 act consisting in a number of distinct though related steps. What he-
46 For an orderly presentation of the steps of the moral act as 
they are found in the writings of St. Thomas see Vernon J. Bourke, Ethics: 
!~ ~ 1ll Moral Philosophy, (6th printing: New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1959), 57-66. This work originally appeared in 1951 and is an expan-
sion of the presentation found in Bourke's 1947 Aquinas lecture entitled 
~. Thomas ~ !h! Greek Moralists, CMi1waukee: Marquette University Press, 
1947), 15ff. Al&o se~ Bourke's ~ and Western Thought: ~ Historico-
Critical Survey, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964), 63-71. A very similar 
and ~qually detailed presentation is found in R.P. Sertillanges, La Philo-
sophie Morale ~ Saint Thomas d'Aguinas, (Paris, 1942), 26; 23ff.-ror a less 
detailed though not unimportant description of the structure or. this act see 
Etienne Gilson's Moral Values and Moral Life, translated, L. Ward, C.S.C., 
(St. Louis: Herder, 1931), 62-66. Finally, one would do well to consult 
the detailed description found in George P. Klubertanz's The Philosophy of 
Human Nature, (New YQrk: App1eton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953), 231-51. 
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comes readily apparent when this act is analysed is the key role played 
by the intellectual and volitional powers throughout the act. The intel-
lect and will are 80 related that each in its own way contributes to the 
very being of the moral act, and this each does by contributing a certain 
causality, a certain "positive influx" which gives the act its being. 
In the previous chapter it was seen that appetition is an incli-
nation that a being has for acquiring the good for which it has received 
existence but from which it is separated. It is the principle by which be-
ings are ordered to their end which is perfective. Like all the substances 
of our experience, rational beings act for an end, their good. However 
they act in virtue of an intellectual apprehension, and consequently they 
tend to their ends by the power of an appetitive principle that is propor-
tioned to this apprehension. As a principle of inclination in a rational 
being, the will is therefore most properly called a passive power: it is 
passive in that it is moved to act (to actively tend to) by the object of 
appetite which is some good apprehended by the intellect; and it is a 
power in that it is the principle whereby the subject actively tends to 
that good. 47 The difficulty lies in determining first, in what matter of 
causality the will is said to be moved to action, and second,what is the 
causality whereby the will is said to be a principle of activity. 
As a passive power the will is put into act by the object of in-
47 See Chapter I, 29-31. 
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tellectual apprehension which is presented to the will as something 
good. 48 In presenting its object the intellect is said to move the will. 
And so Aquinas says that "primarily and directly the intellect moves the 
will.,,49 Then does the intellect act as an efficient cause, for only the 
efficient cause is properly called the cause of motion? One must answer 
negatively; rather "the intellect moves the will in the way that the end 
moves something, since the good that is understeod is the end for the 
will."SO Again. 
Similarly in moving, the end is said to move as the reason for 
moving, but the efficient cause, as the one producing the move-
ment, that is, the one which brings the subject of the motion 
from potency to act. 
The reason for acting is the form of the agent by which it 
acts. It must accordingly be in the agent for it to act. It is 
not there, however, according to its perfect act of being; for 
when that is had the motion comes to rest. But it is in the 
agent by way of an intention, for the end is prior in intention 
but posterior in being. Thus the end preexists in the mover in 
a proper sense intellectually (for it belongs to intellect to 
receive something by way of an intention) and not according to 
its real existence. Hence the intellect moves the will the way 
in which an end is said to move--by conceiving beforehand the 
reason for acting and proposing it to the will.5l 
48 It appears that Aquinas never denied that the will was at 
least partly a passive potency: see Bourke's ~ and Western Thought, 
63. 
49 ~.Q.Q., III, 26c. 
50 Ibid. 
51 De Veritate, XXII, 12c; ~.1., It 82, 4c; ~.Q.Q., I, 72c. 
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Moving in the manner of an end the intellect moves the will in the man-
ner of a final cause, for the end is said to be a mover in the order of 
final causality. 
The intellect is thus the final cause inasmuch as knowing the 
object, the intellect itself in a way becomes the object desired, the good 
object. But it becomes this object only intellectually, in the manner of 
being proper to intellectual knowledge. To know the other is to be the 
other intentionally.52 Intentional possession of the object is but the 
start of intellectual appetition whose culmination is the real possession 
of the good object as it exists in itself. It is a real start, neverthe-
less, since it is the act which initiates appetition. The intellect is 
thus the final cause of the moral act inasmuch as only through the intel-
lect's apprehension of the good object, i.e. only by acquiring its form, 
is that object loved, desired and tended to at all. A condition of its 
being tended to is thus that the good thing be known, that is, that it be 
an object of intellectual apprehension: 
Now appetite is a passive power, because it is moved by the object 
of appetite, which is an 'unmoved mover,' as is said in The Soul 
lD~ anima., III, 10, 433b l5-l~7. But the ob j ecS30f appetIte~s not move the appetite unless it is apprehended. 
52 See Jacques Maritain's ! Preface !£ MetaphYSics, 108-10. 
53 De Veritate, XXV, Ie. This principle is analogously applied 
to the inclination following natural appetition, for while knowledge must 
ground any and all movement directed to an end and while all beings act for 
an end not all beings are directed to their own end by their own knowledge. 
The inclination follOWing natural forms is ordained to its proper end by 
the author of the being's nature who is God: Q! Veritate, XXII, 1, ad2. 
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Because the intellect is the presenter of the good object, a 
question arises as to whether the intellect is the final cause per !! or 
per accidens. A moments reflection on the activity of intellectual ap-
prehension resolves this difficulty. It follows that since man's intellect 
"proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality," and since 
this change is initiated by something outside the knower,54 the very ap-
prehension of the good object depends (ontologicaBy) on the real object 
itself. Apprehension is always "e.pprehension of." The intellect is the 
final cause inasmuch as appr~h~nding the end it, the end, is made an object 
of appetition. Speaking more precisely, it is simply the case that the in-
tellect as intellect is not the end; the intellect is but the bearer of the 
end. Thus the intellect is the final cause of the moral act per accidens. 
Strictly speaking, the per!! final cause of the will's activity and of the 
moral act is the end, the good object in the real order. This is why when 
speaking of that which moves the will, St. Thomas does not always introduce 
the notion of an apprehensive p~r. What moves the will is the good in 
the real order, the end taken in itself <..E!!: !!): "In things willed for 
the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end; and 
this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed 
only for the sake of the end.,,55 
54 1.1., I, 85, 3c. 
55 !.1., I, 19, 2, ad2. 
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It is only secondarily that the intellect enters into this movement inas-
much as it relates the will to the end by way of apprehension. So it is 
that when speaking of those things which move the will, St. Thomas often in-
cludes the intellect because it is an aRprehended good that moves the will 
as an end: "that which is apprehended under the nature of what is good and 
befitting moves the will as an object.,,56 And again, "A thing is said to 
move in two ways: First, as an end, as when we say that the end moves the 
agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the understood 
good is the object of the will, and moves it as an end."57 
Summarizing what has been said about the final causality of 
moral acts, we see that moral acts are performed with a view to an end 
which is some good. Thus the good object is primarily ~ ~ the final 
cause, the reason why the man acts at all. Secondarily, ~ accidens), 
the intellect can be called the final cause for it presents the end--an 
object both good and befitting--to the appetitive power. 58 
Formal Cause 
A closer examination of what is involved in presenting the good 
object to the will reveals that the intellect enters into the causality of 
56 !.1., I-II, 9, 2c. Underlining is mine. 
57 !.1., I, 82, 4c. Underlining is mine. 
58 On the final causality of the intellect in the moral act see 
Marianne Childress', "Efficient Causality in Human Actions," The Modern 
Schoo~, XXVIII, (1951),191-222. Childress' article is an excellent 
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the moral act in another and more direct manner. Distinguishing between 
the exercise and determination of the will's act, St. Thomas observes that 
the object of the will, the good in general, moves the will in the manner 
of a formal cause, because it is in determining the will's act that the 
will is directed to a specific object: 
On the other band, the object moves, by determining the act, 
after the manner of formal principle, whereby in natural things 
actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal 
principle is universal being and truth, which is the object of 
the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect 
moves the will, as presenting its object to it. 59 
As presenter of the good object it appears that the intellect is not only 
the final cause but is also and more properly the formal cause, the cause 
which gives specification to the will's act. What this means is this. The 
will is an appetitive power which is related to and which can tend to any 
object apprehended as something good. The relation to and tending to this 
object is, as we shall presently see, properly the act of the will, and 
therefore while its object is anything which is apprehended as a good, 
study in the causality of the human act. While, as the title indicates, 
this article emphasizes the role of efficient causality of the human act, 
Childress does treat of the other causes. She does not however identify 
the material cause with the acting subject. Such an identification cer-
tainly seems compatible with Childress' work. Also see the study by Gerald 
Smith, S.J. entitled "Intelligence and Liberty," The New Scholasticism, XV, 
(1941), 1-17; Anton Pegis', "Necessity and LibertY:- arur Historical Note on 
St. Thomas Aquinas," The New Scholasticism, XV, (1941), 18-45; Bourke's 
Ethics, Klubertanz's The PhIlosophy of Human Nature. 
59 ~.!., I-II, 9, lc; also ad3, cf. ~~, 6, lc. 
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either a particular good or the ultimate good, the will as an intellectual 
appetite is--prior to apprehension--not actually determined to any specific 
object. It becomes determined or specified only when some good object is 
actually apprehended. It certainly appears then, that the very content of 
the moral act comes from the intellect which, acting as the formal cause, 
specified the act to be the act of willing this apprehended good, or on the 
contrary, it specifies the act to be an act of shunning !h!! apprehended 
evil. 
Lest we misconstrue St. Thomas' thought on this important point, 
let us look a bit more deeply into this matter of the intellect "giving 
content" to the act of the will--and thereby to the moral act taken as a 
whole. If the proper object of the intellect is being and the true; if 
the good is the proper object of the will; and 1f rational appetition 
arises as a consequence of cognition, that 1s, if cognition 1s a condition 
of a thing being known as good. and not of its being good, then how is it 
that the intellect presents the will with a good object? That the intel-
lect must present the will with an object there can be no doubt, for the 
will is a passive power. Nor can there be any doubt that the intellect 
knows objects as being good--or as being evil--for the will's object is 
a known good or a known!!!!. But it is the will, the appetive power, 
which relates to objects in the real order, i.e. the order of existence, 
and thus the special character of goodness, born of the real f1ttingness60 
60 ~ Veritate, XXII, lc. See Gilson, Elements, 243-4. 
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and therefore of real relational character manifest by beings, is some-
thing which does not arise as an essential part of the cognitive act. Cog-
nition is an activity complete in itself; knowledge is an act perfecting 
the knower in its own way. Nevertheless. appetition, at least rational 
appetition, is dependent on cognition and therein lies the difficulty of 
correctly distinguishing the role played by the intellect in the moral act. 
If not always in the order of time, certainly in the order of 
beings, ontologically, it is the case that rational appetition is depen-
dent upon intellection. An object must first be known before it can be 
loved, desired, sought and possessed in the order of existence. The only 
question is whether it is valid to speak of loving, desire, seeking and 
posseSSing without introducing the appetitive powers--which is the case if 
one maintains that the good object is presented to the will and ~ the 
will desires it. Rather, it is in desiring the object that the speCial 
quality of goodness is recognized, for goodness and desirability and in-
clination all pertain to the appetite. Therefore if an object is known 
as good, that is, if the intellect presents its object to the will as some-
thing good, it is hardly the intellect which in knowing the object confers 
upon it the additional note of goodness. On the contrary, it appears that 
the intellect discovers that its object is good when it understands that 
it is desired. The ontological order seems to be 1) knowledge of an ob-
ject--intellectual apprehension; 2) desire of the object if it is good and 
shunning it if it is evil--intellectual appetition; 3) intellectual aware-
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ness of the desirability or lack of desirability of the object, of its 
quality of goodness or evilness: having a good object in place of merely 
an object. It is in or after step three that the will has its proper ob-
ject, an object intellectually apprehended as good. 
But how do we know that this or that desired object is really 
good? How can we be sure it is the ~ good? St. Thomas answers that 
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil the 
nature of the contrary, hence it is that all those things to which 
man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason 
as being good, and consequently as objects of rursuit, and their 
contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. 6 
In short, man must look to his natural inclinations. There are a few basic 
goods which man as man naturally desires'. These are the goods of the body 
and soul which are absolutely fundamental to continued existence and which 
are basic for the development of man's potentialities. There must be some 
beginning to the appetite's inclinations, same starting point. There must 
be same objects to which the will as a nature is naturally directed. Once 
again showing the empirical bent of his mind Aquinas observes that we must 
look to man's natural inclinations as they manifest themselves. What are 
the fundamental objects of man's appetites? What basic inclinations mani-
featly ground all of man's activities? In other words, what are those 
basic ends to which all of men's desires are reduced? Observe how man 
lives: 
61 ~.!., I-II, 94, 2c. 
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For there is in man, first of all, an inclination to good in ac-
c0rdance with the nature which he has in cammon with all substances, 
inasmuch, namely, as every substance seeks the preservation of its 
own being, according to its nature; and by reason of this inclina-
tion, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding 
eff its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is 
in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specifical-
ly, according to that nature which he has in common with other ani-
mals; and in virtue of this inclination, thos~ things are said to 
belong to the natural law which nature has taught !£ !!1 animals, 
such as sexual intercourse, the education of offspring and so forth. 
Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good according to the na-
ture of his reason, which nature is proper to htm. Thus man has a 
natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in so-
ciety; and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination 
belongs to the natural law: ~.~., to shun ignorance, to avoid of-
fending those among whom one has to live, and other such things 
regarding the above inclinations. 62 
It is therefore apparent that the intellectual act of specification in-
volves the discovery of a good object, but does not mean that the intel-
lect as intellect confers the character of goodness upon its apprehended 
object. The intellect's involvement in the moral act may indeed go beyond 
the step of discovery, but that this is its initial step there appears to 
be little doubt. 
Whereas the speculative intellect is directed to contemplation, 
the practical intellect is directed to operation,63 and thus St. Thomas 
notes that the speculative intellect differs from the practical in that 
lithe speculative is only apprehensive of things but the practical is not 
62 Ibid. 
63 !.!., I, 79, llc; De Veritate, XXII, 11, ad4. 
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only apprehensive but causative."64 It is not surprising therefore in 
virtue of its special preoccupation with operation that while the will is 
related to the speculative intellect,65 it is primarily the practical in-
tel1ect that specifies the will's act. In the article where St. Thomas 
says that the intellect moves as a formal cause he goes on to say, 
Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness 
or harmfulness does not move the sensitive appetite, so neither 
does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness 
and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that 
moves, but the practical intel1ect. 66 
The intellect does move the will, but it is the practical intellect which 
moves--not as an agent exercising efficient causality, but as the formal 
cause giving content and the~eby determining the will by presenting to it 
its object and the reason for attending to that object, namely, because it 
is apprehended as aomething good: "The practical intellect is a motive 
power, not as executing movement, but as directed towards it; and this 
belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension. 1I67 Whereas being is 
64 ~.!., II-II, 33, lc. 
65 See Childress' treatment of this relationship: "Efficient 
Causality,l! ~w Scholasticism, 194-8. 
66 S.T., I-II, 9, 1, ad3; cf. S.T., I, 79, 11, adl; S.C.G., I, 
72: II Furthe rm";;re, a form considered by the-intellect does not moVe-or 
cause anythi.ng except through the will, whose ob j ec t is the end and the 
good, by which someone is moved to act. Hence, the speculative intellect 
does not move, nor does the imagination alone without an act c F the esti-
mative power." 
67 S.T., I, 79, 11, adl. See Childress "Efficient Causality," 
New ScholasticIsm, 198f£. 
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the object of the intellect absolutely speaking, it is being apprehended 
under the aspect of goodness which is the proper object of the practical 
intellect: 
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are 
apprehended by men. For that which first falls under apprehen-
sions is being, the understanding of which is included in all 
things whatsoever a man apprehends. Therefore the first inde-
monstrable principle is that ~ ~ thing cannot ~ affirmed 
and denied at the same time, which is based on the notion of 
being and not-being: a~n this principle all others are 
based, as is stated in Metaph. iv. Now as being is the first 
thing that falls under the apprehenSion absolutely, so good 
is the first thing that falls under the apprehenSion of the 
practical reason, ""hich is directed to action (since every 
agent acts for an end, which has the nature of good).68 
Marianne Childress69 points out that the formal causality of the 
intellect involves the will's being ordered to reason. St. Thomas' em-
phasis on the order of reason is found at each and every step of the moral 
act beginning with the initial act of intellectual apprehension of the end 
(intell~),70 and concluding in the will's act of enjoyment (fruition) 
of the possessed good, which consists in resting in the acquired end. 71 
As Childress says, 
This 'order of reason' which implies a formal causality of 
68 §..!., I-II, 94, 2c. 
69 "Efficient Causality, r; ~ §cholasticism, 202ff. 
70 §..l., I-II, 19, lc; Q! Veritate, XXII, 12c; S.T., I-II, 9, lc. 
71 §..l., I-II, llc. 
intellect on the will is more clearly evident 
sequent to velle--that is, from intention on. 
order of end the intellect 'informs' the will 
question of willing a specified end. 72 
70 
in the acts con-
But even in the 
act when it is a 
What is the nature of this information whereby the will is or-
dered to reason? When two powers are ordered to on,: another we find in 
each of them something that belongs to the other,73 and therefore the will 
and intellect being ordered to each other each has something of the other 
within itself. This being a real relationship, there is a real communion 
of being between these powers. Speaking of the relationship between the 
intellect and will in commanded acts St. Thomas says, 
••• since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought 
to bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about 
willing, and the will wills to reason, it follows that the act 
of the reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And 
since the power of the preceding act continues in the act that 
follows, it happens somettmes that there is an act of the will 
in so far as it retains in itself something of the act of the 
reason, as we have stated in reference to use (Q. 16, a.l) and 
choice (Q. 13, a.l); and conversely, that there is an act of 
reason in so far as it retains in itself eomething of the act 
of the will. 74 
Commenting on this passage Childress says that while St. Thomas is de-
scribing tmperium we can apply this principle (of the will's receiving 
72 "Efficient Causality," ~ Scholasticism, 202. 
73 !.l., I-II, 14, 1 adl; see also ~ Veritate, XXII, 15c. 
74 !.l., I-II, 17, lc. 
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something of reason) to the act of intention (intendio).75 It would seem 
that we could apply it not merely to~, electio, tmperius, and intendio, 
but also to the other volition;;:l steps involved in a moral act. 76 In gen-
eral, the viII can be compared to the intellect as matter to form, and so 
we find the analogy drawn by St. Thomas when speaking of the intellect's 
causality in the volitional act of choice. While the act of choice belongs 
properly to the Will, it is nevertheless, an act of the intellect inasmuch 
as an act of the intellect is presupposed in the act of choice: 77 the act 
of choice is materially an act of the will but formally an act of the in-
tellect. 78 Specifying the will's act, the intellect is related to the will 
75 "Efficient Causality," !!! Scholasticism, 207, n.57. 
76 The reason being that an act of the will presupposes and fo~­
lows--ontologically--an act of cognition, and therefore while apprehensIOn 
of the end is required for voluntas it 1s also required for intend~o, con-
sensus, electio, usus, and frutio. Without the initial act of apprehension 
not only would there-not be an act of wishing the end but there could be no 
further acts of intellection and volition. Inteliectus and voluntas are in 
fact presupposed throughout the moral act for they are present virtually 
within all of the following steps of the moral act. And so it is at every 
step along the way: every intellectual and volitional step has something 
of the reality, the being, of the preceding steps. Herein lies the basis 
of the unity of the moral act. On the virtual presence of an act through-
out the moral serie. see Klubertanz's comments as noted by Childress "Ef-
ficient Causality," 1!!! Scholasticism, 210-211. 
77 Sae also B! Veritate, XXII, 15c; !.I., I, 83, 3c. 
78 !.I., I-II, 13, lc. 
79 
as form is to matter. 
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We can say summarily that the intellect is primarily the formal 
cause of the moral act in that it gives specifications to the will's act. 
That is, it is the intellect in its act of apprehension which presents the 
will with an object actually apprehended and thereby actually apecified as 
something good. It is, furthermore, the intellect which, under the influ-
ence of the will, moves to consider not only the end but the maans to the 
end, and therefore the intellect is seen to inform the will throughout the 
moral act. Given its object the will is moved from a state of potentiality 
to that of a will in act. The manner of the intellect's causality is that 
of specification and this is the reason for the matter-form analogy. 
Efficient Cause 
Although the intellect plays an indispensable role in the moral 
act, specification is not in itself moral activity. It remains to be de-
termined Wherein lies the causality whereby human acts receive their realit 
as.!£!!. Here the discussion revolves around the fact that the will is e 
power. This brings us to a consideration of the efficient cause of moral 
79 Although St. Thomas is speaking of the act of choice his 
analogy can, I think, be applied to the general relationship that the in-
tellect and will manifest throughout the moral act. On this analogy see 
Fr. K1ubertanz's "The Unity of Human Activity," The Modern Schoo1man,XXVIII 
(1950). Childress "Efficient Causality," New ScWasticism, 206-11 refers 
to this work and also to that of Fr. Renard, The Philosophy ~ ~ (Mil-
waukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1948), 189 in her own presentation of St. 
Thomas' analogy • 
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activity. The relationship maintaining between the intellect and will in-
volves not only the intellect's movement of the will as was seen above, 
but also that the will in its own way moves the intellect80 as well as the 
other powers of the soul and bOdy.8l Whereas intellect moves in the man-
ner of final and formal causality, St. Thomas says that it belongs to the 
will to move as an efficient cause. 
The reason for this becomes apparent when one considers the man-
ner in which things are said to be objects of the soul's powers, As St. 
Thomas says, "Now a thing is found to have a twofold relationship to the 
soul; one by which the thing itself is in the soul in the soul's manner of 
and not its own, the other by which the soul is referred to the thing in 
its own existence~$2 In other words, there are two ways in which something 
can be an object of the soul. In one way a thing is an object of the in-
tellect: "It is so inasmuch as 1.t is capable of being in the soul, not 
according to its own act of being, but according to the manner of the soul 
--spiritually. This is the essential constitutent of the knowable in so 
far as it is knowable. 1I83 
80 lithe intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will 
moves the intellect in another •••• " !.1., 1,82,4, ad2. 
81 See for example !.Q.Q., I, 72c. 
82 Q! Veritate, XXII, lOc; !.1.,I,82, lc. 
83 Q! Veritate, XXII, lOco 
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The perfection and dignity of the intellect lies in the fact that the 
species of the thing understood is in the intellect itself.84 From another 
point of view however, existing in a knower intentionally is an imperfect 
mode of eXistence, for the object is not possessed according to its own 
mode of being, that is, according to its individual existential state: 
The reason for acting is the form of the agent by which it 
acts. It must accordingly be in the agent for it to act. It is 
not there, however, according to its perfect act of being; for 
when that is had the motion comes to rest. But it is in the 
agent by way of an intention, for the end is prior in intention 
but posterior in being. Thus the end preexists in the mover in 
a proper sense intellectually (for it belongs to an intellect 
to receive something bS way of an intention) and not according to its real existence. 5 
This may appear to create somewhat of a difficulty, for it is 
evident that men love, desire, actively tend to and rest in the possession 
of goods according to the objects own manner of existence, that is, exist-
ence in the real orde~ in the order of non-intentionally. St. Thomas' so-
lution is found in his introduction of that other manner in which things 
are objects of the soul. It is in virtue of the appetitive power that man 
1s related to things as they exist in the real order: "Something is the 
object of the soul according as the soul is inclined and oriented to it 
after the manner of the thing itself as it is in itself. This is the e8-
84 ~., XXII, llc. 
85 ~., XXII, 12c. 
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sential constituent of the appetible in so far as it is appetible.,,86 That 
men actively seek to possess the object of their inclinations cannot be 
denied. Therefore since they are related to this object by their appetite, 
it is this power which is the source of men's active striving to be united 
in the real order with the objects of their love. Hence while the intel-
lect moves as the final and formal cause, it belongs to the will to move 
as an agent in the manner of efficient causality: 
To move in the manner of an efficient cause, however, belongs 
to the will and not to the intellect; for the will is referred 
to things as they are in themselves, whereas the intellect is 
referred to them as existing spiritually in the soul. Now to 
act and to move pertains to things according to their own act 
of being by which they subsist in themselves, not according as 
they exist in the soul in the manner of an intention. It is 
not heat in the soul which heats, but that which is in fire. 
Thus the will is refer~ed to things as subject to motion, but 
not the intellect. Furthermore the act of the will is an in-
clination to something, but not that of the intellect. But an 
inclination is the dispOSition of something that moves other 
things as an efficient cause moves. It is accordingly evident 
that the will has the function of moving 8~ the manner of an 
agent cause; not, however, the intellect. 
This passsge takes uS to the heart of St. Thomes' thought concerning the 
nature of the will's act. The will is an inclination, a tendency, which 
is to say that it is the intrinsic principle of a being's activity, as we 
saw in the previous chapter. One need not look further for an intrinsic 
principle of activity for none is to be found. Through his will man is a 
kind of a self-mover. SUDIIUlrizing St. Thomas' thought Childress says, "Thus 
86 ..!!!!.2., XXII, 10c. 
87 Ibid., XXII, l2c; §..1., I, 80, lc. 
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the will is mover precisely because it is an inclination, whereas the in-
tellect is a cognitive power whose object is to possess things in the in-
tentional order rather than in the order of !!!! naturale. 88 
The objects of the will's movement are the intellect and the 
other powers of the soul and body.89 Regarding the will's movement of the 
intellect, something could be said about the manner in which the will 
causes the intellect to actually understand. 90 However our concern is with 
the moral act and therefore we shall note what, in general, is the nature 
of the will's movement of the practical intellect in a moral act. 
Presented with an object apprehended as something good the will 
91 
naturally and therefore necessarily wills it (velIe). As Bourke says, 
"The will-act is not concerned with doing anything to attain the end, for 
the question of the possibility of achieving the end has not yet been con-
9" 
sidered by the intellect." '" Wishing the end, the will moves the intellect 
to consider (judicium) the attainability of the end. 93 If the intellect 
88 "Efficient Causality," .!i!! Scholasticism, 193. 
89 !! Veritate, XXII, 12c; !.!., I, 82, 4c; I-II, 9, 1c; !.£.Q. 
III, 26c. 
90 !.£.Q., III, 26c. 
91 !! Veritate, XXII, l4c. 
92 Ethics, 59; cf. Childress, "Efficient Causality," New Scho1as 
ticism, 199-204 ---
93 !.!., I-tI, 12, aa. lI2-13c. 
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judges that the end is obtainable, the will intends (intendio) that it be 
attained94 and thereby moves the intellect to deliberate (cons ilium) as to 
the available means. 95 If the means are judged available, then faced with 
these the will may consent (consensus)to them,96 in which case it then 
moves the intellect to judge (judicium electionis)which means are best 
suited to attain the end. 97 This brings the will to the act of choice 
(electio).98 Speaking of this act Bourke says, 
Concomitant with the intellectual judgment of choice (the arbi-
trium)the will performs the volitional act of adherence to~s 
decision •••• As far as the will is concerned, this election is a 
movement in the order of efficient causality, by whir.h the agent 
actively commits himself to follow the last practical judgment. 
With this step and the step just preceeding the moral act reaches 
its climax. 99 
Bourke's observation about the mode of causality involved in the will's 
act of choice can be similarly applied to the other acts of the will. As 
far as the will is concerned, its movement of the intellect is in the man-
ner of efficient causality. For as St. Thomas was seen to observe, it be-
94 Ibid. , 19, 5c; ~ Veritate, XXII, aa. l3-l4c. 
95 Ibid. , 14, (all); ~ Verit:.!!!, XXIV, 1, adll. 
96 Ibid. , I-II, 15 (all). 
97 Ibid. , 14, 6c; 18, 3c. 
98 Ibid. , 13 (all); De Veritate, XXII, l5c; XXII, 13, ads. 9, 
10, 16. 
99 EthiCS, 62. 
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longs to the very nature of the will to move as an agent; and therefore 
whenever the will moves a power of the soul--or when it moves the body--
it does so as an efficient cause. Consequently, while not entering into 
a detailed examination of the steps involved in the moral act, we can know 
at once that since the will is moving the intellect it is doing so as an 
efficient cause. 
SUMMARY 
Thus our investigation has led us to conclude that the moral act 
is a mode of being the existence of which is the outcome of various causal 
principles. As the subject of human acts, the individually existing man 
is the material cause of the state of being that we call moral existence. 
It is he who through activities performed knowingly and willingly begins 
to exist either goodly or evilly, depending on whether his acts are good 
or evil. To act is to be. Indeed, it appears that the mode of existing 
proper to some kinds of being intimately involves activity. Did we not 
begin by observing that change and activity are an tmmediately given fact 
of experie~ce? The final cause of the moral act is the objecS the good and 
the end. Apprehended by the intellect the good is an object of desire and 
therefore is a cause inasmuch as it begins the act. Attracting the indi-
vidual, it causes him to take a position: responding to the object the in-
dividual acts either goodly or evilly. As St. Thomas says, the morality 
of the human act is deprived primarily from the end, the good desired. IOO 
100 ~.Q.Q., III, 9c, Compendium Theology, I, ll6c; ~'!'t I-II, 
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Now to know the other is to be the other; and thus knowing the good, the 
intellect in a way becomes the good. Therefore the intellect in a sense 
moves man to act as the end, which is why St. Thomas says that in the moral 
act the intellect acts as a final cause. None the less, the per!! final 
cause is the good object; only secondarily or per accidens is the intellect 
the final cause. Prtmarily the intellect is the formal principle of the 
moral act. Giving specification to the moral act the intellect acts as a 
formal cause. A prUDary aspect of the moral act is that it be performed 
knowingly: it is a specific object, a known end and known means which 
moves the will. Granting the role played by the object and the intellect, 
it is the will that gives the moral act its reality.!! .!!!.!£.E.. Granted it 
is the intellect which bearing the end awakens the will; but it i8 the Will, 
the rational appetite which has been awakened. Granted that the will's act 
of choice follows the intellectual act of judgment, yet it is the will act-
ing as an efficient cause which, as we shall see, freely moves the practi-
cal intellect in its very act of judgment. In fine, the will is the ef-
ficient cause of the moral act--and therefore the efficient cause of moral 
existence. Presented with a good object, the will moves the intellect to 
consider the attainability of the end. If attainable, the will can then 
18 (All); cf. Jacques Maritain, Neuf lecons sur les notions primieres ~ 
1! philosophe Morale. (Paris: Tequi, 1949),~-2; 40-1. 
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move the various powers of manl01 in the actual attainment of the good. In 
all this, in each of all its acts, the will is moving in the manner of an 
agent exercising efficient causality. 
It would therefore seem that for St. Thomas the proximate in-
trinsic causes of moral existence are the subsisting subject through his 
powers of intellect and will. Man tends to perfect himself knowingly and 
willingly. Capable of intellectual knowledge, man inclines to his good by 
his appetite which, as we saw in the previous chapter, is the principle of 
a being's tendencies. In man this principle is his will. 
In the previous chapter we also observed the primacy given esse 
in the doctrine of St. Thomas. !!!!, the act of existing, is the ultimate 
principle of being. It is the actuality of everything "even the actuality 
of form. II Giving actuality to the form, it gives actuality to the sub-
stance through the form. Giving actuality to the form, it also gives &e-
tuality to the tendency or inclination flOWing from that form. The act of 
tending (to one's end) is, in short, ultimately caused by the substance's 
!.!!!.. For the threefold perfection of .!!!! is "subsistere," "tendere," 
and "reguiescere." Seen in this light the will is indeed the efficient 
101 Following the intellectual act of imperium ~.!., I-II, 17; 
~ Veritate. XXII, 13, ad4, ~ ~.!., I-II, 16) is the act whereby the 
will "using" the various powers of the person--sense appetite, sense cog-
native powers, the motor capacities of the body--acts with an aim of ac-
tually attaining the desired object, the good and the end. See Bourke, 
Ethics, 63-4. 
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cause of the moral act--as is the intellect the formal cause, and the sub-
stance, the being, the individual, the material cause. Yet these should, 
perhaps, be seen more as proximate principles since the ultimate intrinsic 
source of these causes is nought but!!!!. The ultimate intrinsic cause 
of the moral act is, then,!!!!: !!!! as subsistere--grounding the mate-
rial cause; !!!! as tendere--grounding the inclination of the will in which 
consists the efficiency of the act, and which in turn grounds the activity 
of the cognitive power, i.e. the formal cause; !!!! as requiescere--ground-
ing the act of resting in the enjoyment of the possessed good. Finally, 
!!!! is also the ultimate interior principle on the side of the object 
known, the end. The good is desired because it exists, and therefore !!!! 
is the ultimate principle: first, of the being itself and second, of the 
existence the being has when it exists intentionally as the object of the 
cognitive power. 
CHAPrER III 
THE CAUSES OF MORAL GOOD AND MORAL EVIL 
We saw that the will is the prim.ary proximate efficient princi-
ple of the human act because it is the principle of inclination, of activ-
ity in the broad sense of the word. Yet there is an additional reason mlY 
this highest appetitive power is primary and this has to do with the manner 
in which this appetite is manifest in man. Although the intellect presen~ 
the will with its proper object, a known good, the will remains!!!! to ad-
here to or to reject this good. As experience testifies, when a man knows 
that something is good for him he need not proceed to attain it. We say 
that man 1s free to act as he wants; he may even want not to act at all. 
If the nature of the moral act is to be properly understood, it is neces-
sary that we know in what sense it is true to say that man's acts are not 
necessitated. We must account for the fact that human acts are actually 
free acts. For is it not freedom which characterizes the moral act? But 
if man is really a free cause of his acts, then he is the cause of evil 
as well as good, for as experience shows, some human acts are good, others 
evil. The problem than becomes one of determining what in the causality 
of a human act renders it morally good or evil. And since evil is the ab-
sence of being (of due being, to be sure) we must determine how it is that 
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man can freely introduce this absence into his acts. These facets of St. 
Thomas' moral doctrine shall now be examined. 
THE VOLUNTARY ACT 
It is important to note that a human act, that i3, a moral act, 
is essentially a voluntary act. Experience shows that whereas the princi-
pies of some actions lie outside the agent, the principles of other actions 
lie withhl the agent itself. Violently thrust upward, the stone returns 
to earth by the principle of activity which is nought but its very nature. 
Yet, lacking knowledge, the stone cannot be said to plunge downward IIvol-
untari ly." As St. Thomas observes: 
Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, 
some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing 
moved acts or is moved for an end, as was stated above, those 
are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle whose intrinsic 
principle is one not only of movement but of movement for an 
end. Now in order that a thing be done for an end, some know-
ledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or 
is so moved by an intrinsic principle that it has somo:;:: knowledge 
of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that 
it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if 
a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have a prin-
ciple of action or movement, nevertheless, the principle of act-
ing or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in some-
thing else, by which the principle of its action towards an end 
is imprinted on it. Therefore those t~ings are not said to move 
themselves, but to be moved by others. 
Such is the nature of the stone and all objects which though they act, do 
1 ~.!., I-II, 6, lc. 
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not act with knowledge, and which therefore are not really self-movers. 
What of those beings that have knowledge of an end? "Those things," St. 
Thomas continues, 
are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle 
by which they not only act but also act for an end. And, conse-
quently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, i.e., that 
they act and that they act for an end, the movement and acts of 
such things are said to be voluntary; for the term voluntary sig-
nifies that their movements and acts are from their own inclina-
tion. Hence it is that ••• the voluntary is defined not only as 
having a principle within the agent, but also as implying know-
ledge. 2 
Human actions are certainly voluntary for they proceed from an interior 
principle of action whose object is an intelectually known good; and so 
Aquinas concludes the article observing that "since man especially knows 
the end of his work, and moves himself, in his actions especially is the 
voluntary to be found.,,3 
Freedom !! Regards !2 Acting 
Are then children, irrational creatures, and if we add to St. 
Thomas' list,4 mentally retarded adult humans to be numbered among those 
beings that act voluntarily? Since the name voluntary is given to those 
acts which have their principle within the agent and which arises as a con-
2 Ibid. 
3 ~. 
4 ~., 6, 2, sed. contra.: In II Ethics, 5, nne 434ff. 
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sequence of knowledge, it follows that beings capable of nonrational know-
ledge perfo~ acts that are voluntary. However we must distinguish between 
the perfect and imperfect voluntary, for there is a real difference between 
intellectual and non-intellectual knowledge of one's end. "Now knowledge 
of the end" says St. Thomas, 
is twofold, perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the 
end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the 
end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the 
relationship of the means to that end. And such a knowledge 
of the end belongs to none but the rational nature.--But im-
perfect knowledge of the end consists in a mere apprehension 
of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the 
relationship of an act to the end. Such a knowledge of the 
end is exercised by irrational ani~ls, through their senses 
and their natural estimative power. 
Continuing the article we are led by St. Thomas to an important aspect of 
human activity. 
Consequently, perfect knowledge of the end is accompanied by 
the voluntary in its perfect nature, inasmuch as, having ap-
prehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the 
means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. But~­
perfect knowledge of the end is accompanied by the voluntary 
.in its imperfect nature, inasmuch as the agent apprehends the 6 
end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. 
In other words, whereas the acts of irrational animals, as well as those 
of children and mentally defective adult human beings are somewhat volun-
tary, they are not as perfectly voluntary as those of rational beings, for 
5 !.!., I-II, 6, 2c. 
6 ~. 
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the acts of the former are spontaneous. Presented with an object appre-
handed as something good, a non-rational antmal, or more properly speaking, 
an animal not actually exercising intellectual knowledge, cannot not seek 
to obtain it. 7 On the other hand, since his operations flow from the pow-
ers of intellect and will, man is a free agent. In this life man is free 
not to tend to any apprehended good, be this an end or a means to an end. 
Therefore if the will be offered an object which is good uni-
versally and from every point of view, the will tends to it 
necessarily, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will 
its opposite. If on the other hand, the will is offered an ob-
ject that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend 
to it of necessity---And since the lack of any good whatever is 
a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and 
lacking in nothing is such a good that the will cannot non-will 
it; and this is happiness. But any other particular goods, in 
so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-
goods; and, from this point of view, they can be set aside or 
approved by the will, which ~an tend to one and the same thing 
from various points of view. 
Speaking of the source of man's liberty, Gilson says, in commenting on 
this passage, that it 
results from the gap encountered here below between the will 
and its object. In conjunction with an understanding open to 
universal being, the will tends toward universal good. Actually, 
however, it always finds itself in the presence of particular 
goods. These particular goods are incapable of satisfying its 
desire and do not constitute, as far as the will is concerned, 
absolutely nece88a~ ends, and so the will remains entirely free 
in re.pect to them. 
7 See Chapter I, 27ff; esp. 30-31. 
8 !.!., I-II, 10, 2c; cf. ~ Malo, 3, 3c. 
9 The Christian Philosophy of !!. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L.K. 
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No particular object is sufficient to move the will necessarily. There-
fore, since the goods presented by the intellect to the will are, in this 
life, particular goods, the will remains, in this life, free. It may be 
objected, however, that since the Perfect Good is necessarily connected 
with happiness, that man in this life is necessitated by the idea of this 
Good and of this connection. To this St. Thomas answers: 
However, the Perfect Good, which is God, does indeed have a 
necessary connection with the happiness of man, because with-
out Him man cannot be happy. Nevertheless, the necessity of 
this connection is not clearly evident to man in this life, 
because he does not see God in His Essence. lO 
Thus we see that the will is free both as regards the exercise 
of its act which is concerned with the end and as regards the specification 
of its act which concerns the means of obtaining the end. In this l1fe no 
object apprehended as an end necessitates the will, for "no matter what the 
object be, it is man's power not to think of it and consequently not to 
will it actually.IIll As regards the specification of the will, we see that 
Shook, C.S.B. (2nd printing: New York: Random House, Inc., 1956), 252 
cf. Gilson's Elements of Christian Philosophy, 252-53, 256-57. On this 
point see the excellent articles by Gerald Smith, S.J., and Anton Peg!s 
appearing in The New Scholasticism, Vol.XV (1941). Fr. Smith's article is 
entitled "Intei"iigence and Liberty," 1-17. The article by Professor Pegis 
is entitled "Necessity and Liberty: An Historical Note on St. Thomas 
Aquinas," 18-45. 
10 De Malo, 3, 3c as translated by Vernon J. Bourke in his 
Ethics, 113; c17 De Veri!!!!, X, llc; XVIII, Ie. 
11 !.!., I-II, 10, 2c. 
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the will is free even here. For although choice presupposes a judgmental 
act of the intellect, nevertheless it is the will which leads the intellect 
to choose what it, the will, desires best. As Fr. Smith says, it may be 
objecl:ed that 
if the will follows the judgment, then---although one may see 
that there are alternatives---neverhteless there is only one 
alternative which, by hypothesis, can be chosen. If 80, the 
reason for this choice, supposing the will follows this reason 
for the choice, is also the reason which makes any other choice 
impossible. Thus the will is not free. 
St. Thomas' answer is that the judgment presenting a good 
which one is to accept, or reject, is due to an influence not 
wholly intellectual. We do not indeed choose what we have fi-
nally decided is the best; but this only means---since 'best' 
here is just a relative, contingent best---that our will has 
made it the bert. We judge a thing best because we wish to 
judge it best. 2 
The nature of the voluntary act as it is manifest by man is, then, essen-
tial1y a non-necessitated act. Though the will must be put into act by 
an object, the will is free to reject these particular goods. It is free 
as regard to the end and the means. Nor is the will forced when its ob-
ject is the idea of the Absolute Good. In short, in this life man is a 
free agent. 
Here we have discovered the reason why human acts are essentially 
moral acts. Since the result, the material causes of a moral act is the 
subject who in acting either really perfects his nature or in fact really 
12 "Intelligence and Liberty," 11. As to St. Thomas' distinc-
tion of the will's act see S.T., I-II, 9, aa. I and 2c; !.!., I, 82, 2c; 
Q! M!!£, 3, 3c; 6, lc; Q! Veritate, XXII, 6c. 
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perverts it, i.e., performs acts that are really good or evil; since the 
causes of this becoming are first, the good object moving as a final cause, 
second, the intellect as presenting the end to the will and as formally 
specifying its object, and finally, the will as the efficient cause moving 
the intellect and other powers of man--to attain or reject these goods; 
since in this order of becoming the will is a non-necessitated power, be-
ing forced neither in regards the execution nor specification of its act, 
then it follows that the human act is in this life essentially a freely 
caused act. Man is free to make of htmself what he wishes; he is above 
all a voluntary agent. 
Freedom !! Regards 1£ ~ Acting 
But if man is free to act, so he is also free not to act, and 
this freedom is similarly grounded in the power of intellect and the will. 
For the voluntary extends not only to the will's actions but also to its 
nonactions. To the question of whether there can be voluntariness with-
out an act St. Thomas answers in the affirmative. The reason for this is 
• that something can proceed from another in two ways.13 In one way some-
thing proceeds from another inasmuch as the other acts; for example, heat-
ing proceeds from heat. In another way something proceeds from another 
precisely from the fact that this other does not act. "Thus the sinking 
13 ~.l., I-II, 6, 4c. 
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of a ship is attributed to the helmsman, from his having ceased to steer~lI14 
And thus the helmsman by his non-acting is a real cause of the sinking of 
the ship, that is, if he could and should have acted. "For if the helms-
man were unable to steer the ship, or if the ship's helm were not entrusted 
to him, the sinking of the ship would not be attributed to him, although 
it might be due to his absence from the helm.,,15 St. Thomas concludes: 
Since, then, by willing and acting, the will is able, and 
sometimes ought to hinder not-willing and not-acting, this not-
willing and not-acting is imputed to the will as though pro-
ceeding from it. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary 
without an act, and this sometimes without an outward act, but 
with an interior act, for instance, when one wills not to act, 
and sometimes without an interior act, as when one does not will 
to act. 16 
The question of voluntariness without an act is an important aspect of St. 
Thomas' thought, for as we shall presently see it is this notion which 
enables him to explain how the individual can be said to be the "cause" 
of moral evil. 
A moral act is an act performed knowingly and willingly for an 
end which is something good. All of the above mentioned causes of the 
14 Ibid., cf. S.T., I, 49, 2, ad3. It is interesting to note 
that St. Thomas-u8es the-eximple of the helmsman in one of his earliest 
works. In ~ Principiis Naturae St. Thomas observes that 11 a pilot may be 
the cause of saving or sinking a ship: of the former by his presence, of 
the latter by his absence." Is translated by V. Bourke in his Pocket Aqui-
~, 70. 
15 ~. 
16 ~., cf. In II, ~., d. 35, art. 3. 
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moral act can be found in this sentence: the subject. the powers of in-
tellection and appetition, and the end. In the line of secondary causality, 
that is precending from the fact that every being and every cause and there 
fore every good receives its existence and is sustained in that existence 
by God,17 these are the causes which each in its own manner contribute a 
"positive influx" to the being and becoming of the moral act. Each in its 
own order but all acting together converge to produce the reality of the 
human act--an act which is either good or evil. 
CAUSALITY OPERATIVE IN A MORALLY GOOD ACT 
Seeonda!y Causality 
Let US take the case of a good act. What is it in a human act, 
in the causality of this act which renders it good? Bow is a good human 
act caused? Or again, how are the various causes operative when a good 
human act comes into being? Good or evil in human acts l8 ultimately de-
pends on whether the acts are in accordance with or against reason. 
Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in rela-
tion to the reason, because, as Dionysius says, the good of man 
is to be in accordance with reason, ~ !!!! l! !2 k! against 
17 Se~ for example, !.Q.Q., III, Qq. 65-70. 
18 The following discussion concerns primarily the interior 
quality of the moral act which is, as Bourke says, "the root and source of 
the moral quality of the whole moral act." Ethics, 144-45. Thus while we 
can speak of the morality of the commanded act, the point here is that mor-
ality is a quality attributed essentially to the interior act of the will. 
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reason ~e divinis nominibus, IV, 327. For that is good for a 
thing which suits it according to its form; and evil, that which 
is against the order of its form. It is therefore evident that 
the difference of good and evil, considered in reference to the 
object, is an essential difference in relation to feason, i.e., 
according as the object is suitable or unsuitable. 9 
St. Thomas points to the " rule of reason" because as Professor Bourke ob-
serves,20 reaBon is the specific difference of man. "Hi.s substantial form 
is rational." And therefore "when man acts reasonably. he acts in accord 
with his own formal nature." Acting in accord with his own formal nature 
man is in fact acting goodly. But inasmuch as every human act is per-
formed deliberately in view of consciously apprehended ends, they are ra-
tional acts, and therefore are not all human acts morally good acts? For 
a human act is by definition a reasonable act--man has his reasons. How-
ever this is not what St. Thomas has in mind when he speaks of the i:rule 
of reason. 1I As Father Copleston puts the matter, 
it does not follow that the good which a man chooses and for 
the attainment of which he takes particular means is neces-
sarily compatible with the objective good for man. There is 
therefore room for the concept of 'right reason,' reason di-
recting man's acts to the attainment of the objective good 
for man. 21 
In other words, since the object of the cognitive power is the true, and 
19 ~.!., I-II, 18, 5c; cf. 1& II Ethics, lect. 2. 
20 Ethics, 126. 
21 Aquinas, (Reprinted: Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 
1963), 204-5. 
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since the object of the appetitive power is the good, and since in this 
life not every good is necessarily objectively good for man and since man 
can know this for a tact, then before man pursues any particular good he 
ought to first apply his reason to the task of determining whether this 
particular good is a ~ good,22 that is whether it is objectively good. 
He ought to, that is, because man is by nature a rational antmal. And this 
is precisely St. Thomas' point. If in bringing the human act into exist-
ence the individual acts reasonably, that is with an eye to his !!2! good, 
then the human act is good; and since the individual has freely applied 
the rule of reason his act is morally good. 
More precisely, this involves the free initiative of the will. 
Presented with a particular good the will is, as we have seen, free both 
as regards the end and the means of attaining the end. Possessing reason 
man is able to consider any good object from the point of view of whether 
it is his ~ good. He can "weigh" various goods in the light of what he 
knows is his real good and end; he can measure particular goods to deter-
mine if they are truly perfective of his nature. He can even consider the 
22 liThe will is not always directed to what is truly good, but 
sometimes to the apparent good; and this has indeed some measure of good, 
but not of a good that is suitable absolutely to be desired. Hence it is 
that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evi1." S.T., I-
II, 19, 1, ad3, underlining is mine. And again, "The good in viewof which 
one acta is not always a!!2! good; but sometimes it is a true good, some-
times an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results 
from the end in view." §. • .:r., I-II, 18, 4, adl, underlining is mine. 
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ult~te rule: God's Eternal Law. 23 But whether or not man actually 
"weighs" the good, whether or not he actually applies the rule of reason 
and the eternal law and then, most importantly, whether man actually per-
forms an act according to the dictate of this rule depends only secondarily 
on the cognitive power. Recall Father Smith's observation about the man-
ner in which the will influences (causes) the act of judgment. To be sure 
it is reason which "judges, II which "weighs," which "applies the rule of 
reason;" but it is the will which moves reason to actually "judge," to.!£,-
tually "weigh," to actually apply the "rule." As the efficient cause of 
the moral act. the initiative to move or not to move reason to consider 
whether a particular good is objectively good is an initiative which comes 
from the will. The will can initiate the human act either with or without 
the intellect's having applied the rule of reason. The will has its good 
object and that is good enough for it--if it wishes to be so. The will is 
not farced to move reason to consider the objective goodness of its object. 
If it does move reason to so conSider, it does 80 freely; and if it does 
not move reason, then it is because it freely did not wish to do so. In 
23 "Now in those things that are done by the will, the proxi:ma.tle 
rule is human reason, while the supreme rule is the eternal law. When, 
therefore, a human act tends to the end according to the order of reason 
and of the eternal law, then that act is right; but when it turns aside 
from that rectitude,_then it is said to be a sin. Now it is evident, from 
what has been said is.T., I-II, 19, 3, and ad~1 that every voluntary act 
that turns aside from the order of reason and of the eternal law is evil, 
and that every good aet is in accord with reason and the eternal law. 1I S.T., 
I-II, 21, lc. . - -
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either case the initiative is on the part of the will, for it is the agent 
cause acting efficiently. 
As to what characterizes the goodness of a human act. we see 
that the act is good when it is measured by the rule of reason. When man 
acts from the judgment that a particular good is also objectively good for 
him then his act is a good act, a morally good act in fact, because by his 
will he has freely moved his reascn to actually reason about the objective 
goodness of the end. (It is not necessary that the judgment of reason be 
objectively correct, however. For as we say, a man can honestly be mis-
taken in his judgments as to what things are truly good for him. There is 
room here for erring reason. 24 The point is that since man is a rational 
being he should exercise his rea~on in order to determine fi~st what things 
are truly good for him, and second, how particular goods "measure .. uptl to 
these objective goods. In other words, every man is obliged to apply his 
reasons to the task of determining as best he can whether particular goods 
are truly good). 
The object of the intellect is the true. Instead of preventing 
man from exercising his highest cognitive power. the will in causing rea-
son to seek the~, in this case causing the practical reason to seek the 
24 On the types of ignorance recognized by St. Thomas see S.T., 
I-II, 6, 8c; also see D~~, 3, 8c; ~ II ~., d. 22, q. 2, 2, c.- Be-
sides ignorance, Saint Thomas also recognizes two other factors which in-
fluence the degree of voluntariness of a human action. These are fear and 
concupiscence. See Bourke's Ethics. 67-105. 
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~ good, the will is moving reason to function naturally and therefore 
goodly. If the will initiates an act--either an exterior act or, more im-
portantly from the viewpoint of the morality of the act, initiates an in-
terior act--on the basis of "right reason," then the moral act taken as a 
single entity will have the fullness of perfection it ought to have: it 
will have the due good, which for a human act consists in the measure, the 
form of right reason. And thus St. Thomas says, 
Again, since reason is able to apprehend many goods and a 
multiplicity of the ends, and since for each thing there is a 
proper end, there will be, then, for the will an end and a first 
motivating object which is not merely any good, but same deter-
minate good. H~nce, when the will inclines to act !voluntas 
tendit in ~~/as ~ed by the a£prehension of reason, present-
ing a proper good i2roprium~/to it, the result is a fitting 
action. 25 
We are now in a more favorable pOSition to understand the nature 
of the causality in a good human act. Evil in an operation occurs, says 
Thomas, either "by the withdraWal of the due operation. or because it has 
not its due mode and order. tl26 The "due mode and order" of the human act 
is that it can be measured by the rule of reason. Therefore, the human 
act is good because the rule of reason has not been withdrawn from the act. 
Now the formal cause of the human act was seen to be the cognitive power 
both apprehending the end and deliberating and judging the means to the end. 
25 f.f.Q., III, 10, underlining is mine. 
26 See Chapter II, page 47, note 21. 
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What characterizes the good human act from the point of view of this power 
is that reason actually judges the objective goodness of the will's object 
·-and that in virtue of this judgment the will act is initiated. This is 
to say that the act is good when it has the ~ of the rule of right rea-
son (and Eternal Law). The rule of reason, reason judging the objective 
goodness of the object, thus confers something extra, an additional per-
fection to the act. It confers a measure, the very measure of reason which 
1s itself a mode of actuality, of existence. So measured, the act has its 
due form, its due perfection. The final cause of the human act is the end 
apprehended by reason. Now when reason judges that the object is objec-
tively good then the formal object of the will is not merely an end but a 
~~. 
Agai~we observed that the human act has four causes. Here the 
question is how these causes render not merely a human act, but a good hu-
man act. The four causes are operative, but now they are viewed from the 
point of view of conferring goodness, properly so called, that is the per-
fection which comes from having fulfilled one's nature and thus having at-
tained due end--for the faculties and powers also have their proper ends, 
which is not something totally opposed to the end of the subject. Indeed, 
it is the manner in which some beings manifestly attain their completion, 
their second perfection and final good. Now a thing is good inasmuch as 
it has being, inasmuch as it has eXistence, and therefore the human act 
regarded merely as an act will be good. What characterizes the special 
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quality of moral goodness of the act is thus not the act simply speaking, 
but rather that this act has the degree of perfection, of being, and thus 
the degree of goodness that it ought to have as a human act. Therefore we 
can distinguish between the causes of the human act and the quality of 
goodness, of perfection and exis'.ence of these causes. In fine, while the 
formal cause of the human !£! is the intellect or reason and the final 
cause is the end, the causes of the good human .!£! are right reason and a 
proper or due end. The formal cause of the good act is thus not merely the 
cognitive power, but the cognitive power applying the rule of reason <and 
of Eternal Law) and thus conferring additional being on the object, an ad-
ditional being which is due in a human act. The final cause is not merely 
the end, nor is it the intellect as apprehending the end. Rather it is an 
end that is apprehended as truly good. 
We can now begin to understand the importance of the will in the 
execution of the good act. That the act be measured by right reason and 
the Eternal Law and that the object of the will be a proper and due good 
depends upon t~le agency of the wilL For as the intellectual inclination 
of man, it is the will which can, and which in a good act actually does, 
move reason to measure the objective goodness of the object. When the will 
proceeds to initiate its act to incline to its object, having already moved 
reason to apply its rule, the act taken as a whole, as a unified entity, 
is good. The act is good because it does not lack, is not deprived of what 
it ought to have as a human act, namely, that it be measured by the rule 
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of reason and the Eternal Law and that the end consequently be a proper 
good. Since the will can incline to an object with or without having moved 
reason to apply its rule, it appears that there are two moments in the 
human act: the act whereby the will moves or does not move reason to con-
sider the objective goodness of the end, and the act whereby the will ac-
tually inclines to its object. i.e., the act which initiates the human act. 
When the will, then, having moved reason to apply its rule breaks forth 
into action now "as moved by the apprehension of reason, as presenting a 
proper good to it, the result is a fitting action," a good act. 
"The result is a fitting action" which is a ,jay of sayinG that the 
result is the coming into existence of a fitting human being. For St. tho-
mas consistently maintains that while we speak of human activity in te~ 
of the powers or faculties of the activity, nevertheless the human act is 
an act of the whole man. "Properly speaking, it is not a power which knows 
or intends, but the supposit through a power."27 To act is to be, and thus 
if his human act has the perfection proper and due to it, then man as the 
subject and material cause of the act has himself obtained through that act 
a mode of being of existence which is good. Acting goodly is a mode of be-
ing goodly. In his good human act the individual has, in fine, become more 
thsn he was: he has begun to acquire the goods and perfections for which 
he was created but from which he is separated. Good inasmuch as he exists. 
27 Q! Veritate, XXII, 13, ad7. 
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in performing human acts man is striving to complete himself. The material 
cause of the good human act is the individual: a good seeking additional 
~oodness in the line of acquisition open to him being the kind of thing he 
is. 
Now the line of being, action, and goodness is the line of ac-
tuality and existence. As we observed in the previous chapters, there is 
for St. Thomas an act which is prior to every actuality and every form and 
which consequently lies at the root of the moral act. And this is the very 
act of existing. The ultimate interior cause of good moral existents is, 
then, its act of existing,.!!!!: .!!!.! as subsistere, as tendere, and as 
reguiescere. 
God's Causal Influx 
There remains but one final consideration. A fundamental tenant 
in St. Thomas' metaphysics is that God is is all things as an agent is pre-
sent to that upon which it acts. 
Now, .sfnce God is being itself by his own essence, created being 
must be His proper effect •••• But God causes this effect in things 
not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are pre-
served in being •••• Therefore, as long as a thing has being, so long 
must God be present to it, according to its mode of being. But be-
ing is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally present within 
all things, since it is formal in respect of everything found in a 
thing, as was shown above. 1Q.it, 1, ad3; Q. 7 , a .17. Hence it mus t be 
that God is in all things, and innermost. 28 -
28 !.1., I. 8, 1c. 
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From this it follows that God is present and works in every agent in three 
ways. 29 First, as the cause of every operation as its end; second, as the 
cause of the action in every agent; third, God gives created agents their 
forms and preserves them in being. A consequence of this doctrine is that 
wherever there is being, actuality, or cAUsality one can always discover 
the presence of Ipsum!!!!. The ulttmate source and first cause of being 
on any and every level is God. Consequently, inasmuch as the.!!!! of the 
being of our experience participate in Ipsum !!!! we must say that the ul-
ttmate cause, though now the ultimate exterior cause, of the good moral act 
is God. The question at this point is how does God's presence to his crea-
tures affect their operations and thus the causality of the moral act. 
While any serious investigation into this subject would take us far beyond 
the scope of this work. 30 we can see the direction that St. Thomas' thought 
takes. Though God is tmmediately cooperating with all the operations per-
formed by all finite beings this does not mean that creatures themselves 
do not exercise operations of their own. As Gilson notes,31 
The reverse is true. Just u the 1mmediate presence of God to 
creatures does not deprive them of their own being but, on the 
29 S.T., I, lOS, 5c; cf. S.C.G., III, Qq. 65-67. 
-- ---
30 An excellent work in this area is Joseph Martin Graham's 
Secondary Causal Influx Accordiy ~ Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
31 Elements, 182. 
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contrary, causes it to be, so also His tmmediate eo-operation 
with their operations does not deprive them of their own ef-
ficacy but, on the contrary, causes creatures to be able to 
act as well as to be. In fact, the co-operation of God with 
the operations of creatures is but another name for His pre-
sence by essence to the whole of creation. 
In short, the absolutely first cause of the moral act is God. Whatever 
being and goodness are made manifest in the moral act, whatever secondary 
causes contribute to the being and becoming of the act, including, of 
course, the creatures ultimate interior first act, !!!!, are all caused 
by and participate in Ipsum!!!!. In Htm are all things and apart from 
Htm there is only nothingness and non-being. 
CAUSALITY OPERATING IN A MOlWJ..Y EVIL ACT 
Seconda;y Causality 
Unfortunately, however, not every human act is morally good, 
often they are evil, and therefore it is necessary to examine the causes 
of moral evil. Necessary it seems, because we have here a different order 
of being, or, to be more precise, we are no longer in the order of being 
which is the order of good. Rather we find ourselves in the order of pri-
vation, the order of non-being which is evil. We have here then a para-
dox. We say that man is the cause of moral evil yet how can this be? AI-
though evil is a privation whose subject is something actual and good, still 
evil is in itself, that is, essentially, non-being. But how can man be 
the cause, indeed the voluntary cause, of non-being? Professor Maritain 
cautions, 
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we cannot reason about the line of evil in the same way as we 
do about the line of good, nor can we apply indiscriminately 
to the former theses established in relation to the latter. 
The perspective haa to be reversed; we have to think in terms 
of nihil 1ns~ead of thinking in te~ of !!!!.32 
From what has been said it is sufficiently evident that what 
characterizes an evil human act is its departure from the rule of reason. 
When man initiates the human act without having applied the rule of rea-
son, when the formal object of his will is not a good thought to be truly 
good, he is putting aSide, ignoring, leaving potential and therefore non-
existent the exercise of his reason--reason seeking the truth--which is 
what specifies man as man. It is for man to act less than a man and there-
fore to act evilly. The act is evil because right reason, the "due mode 
and order" of a human act, is absent. We have here then an inordinate act. 
An act which is not ordered as it ought to be, an act lacking a due per-
fection. What kind of causes can such an act have? 
Having concluded that an evil human act is a sinful act33 St. 
Thomas says that a sin is an inordinate act, and therefore it has an es-
sential and an accidental cause: 
Accordingly, in so far as it is an act, it can have a direct 
cause, even as any other act; but in so far as it is inordi-
nate, it has a cause in the same way as a negation or priva-
32 Existence and the Existent. This writer's debt to Professor 
Maritain's researches wi~be-evident in what follows. 
33 1.1., I-II, 21, lc. 
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tion can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a 
negation. First, the absence of the cause of affirmation: 
1.~., the negation of the cause itself is the cause of the 
negation in itself, since the result of removing the cause 
is the removal of the effect. Thus the absence of the sun is 
the cause of darkness. In the second place, the casue of an 
affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is the acci-
dental cause of the resulting negation. Thus fire, by caus-
ing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently 
causes a privation of cold. 34 
While the first cause is adequate to account for simple negation, it will 
not suffice to account for sin or for any kind of evil, for evil is not 
mere negation but privation, the absence of a ~ good. Now the differ-
ence is this, that no cause is needed to account for simple negation, aim-
pIe non-being. It is precisely a lack of a cause that accounts--if we be 
permitted the use of a positive concept to convey a negative meaning--it 
is precisely the lack of a cause that accounts for non-being. On the other 
hand, the lack of order in every kind of evil is a privation of that which 
something ought naturally to have. Now such a lack of order must have a 
cause, though it be a deficient or accidental cause. 
For that which naturally is and ought to be in a thing is 
never lacking except because of some impeding cause. And 
accordingly, we are wont to say that evil, which consists 
in a certain privation'3gas a deficient cause, or an acci-
dental efficient cause. 
But every accidental cause is reducible to an essential cause, and there-
34 ~., 75, Ie. 
35 ~. 
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fore one must uncover the essential efficient cause of evil. St. Thomas 
continues, 
Since, then, sin has, on the part of its lack of order an 
accidental efficient cause, and on the part of the act, an 
essential efficient cause, it follows that the lack of order 
in sin is a result of the cause of the act. 
But the efficient cause of::he moral act is the will. 
Accordingly, then, the will lacking the direction of the rule 
of reason and of the divine law, and intent on some mutable 
good, causes the act of sin essentially, and the lack of order 
in the act aCCidentally and without intention; for the lack 
of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the 
wilL 36 
Let us pause here a moment. The will is the essential cause of 
evil in an act because it is the direct cause of the act. As the direct 
cause of the act the will is good, and thus the cause of evil is a good. 
However, it is abo the "impeding cause" in this case the "deficient cause," 
inasmuch as through the efficiency of the will the act itself lacks some-
thing it ought to have, namely the rule of reason. In initiating the act 
the will is the direct proximate interior cause of the act, but in initi-
ating the act without having moved reason to consider the objective good-
ness of the end and therefore without having for itself an object judged 
to be truly good, the will is the cause, "indirect," "accidental," Ildefi-
cient" to be sure, but nevertheless the real cause, of the act's lacking 
36 .!!?!!!. 
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the direction of right reason. For it is within the power of the will to 
move the other powers of man tothe performance of operations. Therefore, 
the will can move reason to applyits rule, its judgment, or it can act with-
out the direction of right reason. The initiative is on the part of the 
will. And therefore although one may speak of other causes of sin, in the 
end the will alone is sufficient to cause moral evil. 
Yet neither does external enticement move the reason of neces-
sity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed externally 
of necessity move the sensitive appetite. except perhaps it be 
disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive ap-
petite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. There-
fore something external can be a cause moving to Sin, but not 
so as to be its sufficient cause. But t~, sufficient accom-
plishing cause of sin is the will alone. 
The moment of moral eVil. that instant when the human act is, as Maritain 
says,38 "bitten by nothingness" 0~Ct'rs then, wan the will b4'eaks forth 
into action without having applied the rule of reason (or the Eternal Law, 
when this can be known): But when the will breaks forth into action, at 
the apprehension of sense cognition, or of reason itself presenting some 
other good at variance with its proper good, the result in the action of 
37 ~.I .• I-II, 75, 3c; cf. !.£.Q., III, 10: Having examined the 
principles (causes) of moral actions L"the first active principle in moral 
actions is the thing that is cognitively apprehended ..... the fourth is «he mo-
tive power which carries out the command of reason."1 in order tC'l determine 
the causes of evil human acts, St. Thomas concludes-"that moral fault is 
found primarily and principally in the act of the will only, and so it is 
quite reasonable to say. as a result, that an act is moral because it is 
voluntary. Therefore, the root and source of moral wrongdoing is to be 
sought in the act of will." Cf. S.T., I-II, 75, 2c. 
38 Saint Thomas and the Problem of Evil, trans. Gordon Andison. 
(Milwaukee: Marquette university-Press, 1942)-;-22. 
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the will is a moral fault. tl39 It appears that we are at the source of 
moral evil. Evil is attributed primarily to the will inasmuch as it is 
the efficient cause of the human act. However we have not yet reached our 
goal even in discussing the line of efficient causality of moral evil. For 
although the will is the efficient cause of the evil act, it is also the 
cause of a certain defect which precedes the evil act and which ultUnately 
grounds the "deficiency" that characterizes the privative character of the 
morally evil act. 
St. Thomas teaches that, "In action, evil is caused by reason of 
the defect of some principle of action, either of the principle or the in-
strumental agent.,,40 In other words, the privation that attaches to an ac-
tion results from a prior defect--a priority that is ontological and not 
merely temporal--in the disposition of the power that causes the act. It 
would seem to follow from this that the cause of evil in action is a prior 
evil in the being of the agent. In fact, this is what St. Thomas maintains: 
For the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as 
it is itself, unless it is Unpeded by some exterior thing; and 
this amounts to some defect in it. Hence evil never follows in 
the effect unless some other eVil pre-exists in the agent or in 
the matter, as was said above. 4l 
However this is not always the case, for "Evil has a deficient cause in 
39 !.£.Q., III, lOco 
40 !.!., I, 49, lc. 
41 !.!., I, 49, I, ad3. 
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voluntary beings otherwise than in natural things~1f42 In voluntary beings, 
and here St. Thomas means the more perfect kind of voluntary being, namely 
those actually exerciSing rationality. a deficiency does precede the evil 
act, however here the deficiency is not itself an evil: 
But in voluntary beings the defect of the action comes from 
an actually deficient will Lthe active principl~7inasmuch as 
it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This 
defect, however, is not a fault L Qui tamen defectus non est 
-43 --culpa ••• ..!./ 
There is, therefore, a defect in the agent which precedes the evil human 
act, a defect which is not yet a privation or evil but which nevertheless 
is the root, the ontological precondition for the evil human act. Further-
more, this defect is not an evil even though it is voluntary. In the Summa 
Contra Genti1es44 Aquinas brings these various elements together. He says 
that a difficulty seems to result from concluding that the root and source 
of moral wrongdoing is the will. 
Since a defective act stems from a defect in the active prin-
ciple, we must understand that there is a defect in the will 
preceding the moral fault. Of course, if this defect be natu-
ral, then it is always attached to the will, and so the will 
would always commit a morally bad action when it acts. But 
virtuous acts show that this conclusion is false. On the 
other hand, if the defect be voluntary, it is already a mor-
ally bad act, and we will have to look in turn for its cause. 
Therefore, we must say that the defect pre-existing in the will 
42 Ibid. 
43 ~. 
44 III. lOco 
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sins in every one of its acts. Nor can we attribute the defect 
to chance or accident, for then there would be no moral fault 
in us, since chance events are not premeditated and are beyond 
the control of reason. So, the defect is voluntary. Yet, it is 
not a moral fault; otherwise we should go on to infinity. 
Consequently we must distinguish two moments in the development of the 
evil human act. We have already seen in what consists the deficiency of 
the act as well as why this deficiency yields the act morally evil. OUr 
investigation into the intrinsic efficient cause of moral evil will be com-
pleted when we determine the nature of that prior deficiency, that defi-
ciency which is voluntary and not yet evil, but which is none the less at 
the root of moral evil. 
In R! ~t 1, 3, St. Thomas sets .out to explain the natur. of 
the defect which precedes the deficient act of choice?5 He begins with 
the general principle that, 
in all things wherever one factor exists as the rule and measure 
of the other, good in the one that is ruled and measured origi-
nates from the fact that it is ruled in conformity with the rule 
and measure.--the eVi14rrises from its not being ruled or measured 
according to the rule. 
A practical example is that of a craftsman. How is he to cut wood in a 
straight line? St. Thomas says that "were the craftsman's hand the rule 
itself of carving, he could not carve the wood otherwise than rightly.,,47 
45 §!. Thomas and the Problem of !!!!. 30. 
46 Ibid., Much of what follows will be taken from Maritain's 
penetrating study. 
47 i.!., I, 63, Ie. 
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However as experience shows, often to the frustration of the craftsman, 
this is not the case. His hand is not "the rule itself of carving.,,48 
No, in order to cut a straight line it is necessary for htm to apply some 
rule, which for him is a material ruler. Therefore, if he does not cut a 
straight line, "that is, if he makes a bad cutting, that bad cutting will 
be caused by the fact that the craftsman did not hold the ruler in his 
hand !1+9 St. Thomas then draws the analogy in human matters. The rule of 
human acts is not identical with the very power of the agent, for if it 
were, then the act would never fall short of rectitude, which is clearly 
contrary to the facts. 50 But i~asmuch as the rule of human acts is not 
identical with the very power of the agent these acts must be measured by 
some external rule, external to the power that i8, which for man is reason 
and divine law. "Similarly, delection and everything that happens in hu-
man affairs should be measured and ruled according to the rule of reason 
and of divine law. II5l St. Thomas then proceeds to put his finger, so to 
speak, on the defect which precedes the moral act. Let us follow Mari-
tain's translation and commentary on the passage from ~~: 
48 ~. 
49 !!!~, 1, 3c. 
50 !.1., I, 63, lc. 
51 B! Malo, 1, 3co 
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'That the will .!!2!! !!.2! .!!!.! ./J.e!:,. us take careful note of the 
simple negation expressed there/--that the will does not make 
.!!!.! £! the rule of reason and of divine law,' t~t does-not 
have the ruler in its hand,--this then, is the absence or the 
deficiency 'which must be considered in the will before the 
faulty choice in which alone moral evil consists. And for that 
very absence or that lack which consists in not making use of 
the rule,' not taking the rule in hand» 'there!! ~ E!!!! !:..2 
.!.!!! .! cause, !2!: .!!!! !:!!l freedom £! !:.h!.!!li, whereby.!! £!!! 
.!£!:. .2! ~ .!£!:., !! enough •••• ' Bere we are at the very begin-
ning; impossible to go any further back; a free defect, a de-
fect of which freedom itself is the negative and deficient pri-
mary cause;--and it is the will thus in default which, acting 
with this defect, is the cause--in quantum deficiens--of moral 
eVil. 52 --
St. Thomas then repeats his assertion that this deficiency is 
not a moral fault. "This very lack which consists in not paying attention 
in act to the rule, this lack considered in itself is not an evil, neither 
in the sense of an evil deriving from fault nor of an evil conSisting of 
fault." The reason being that "the soul is not obliged, nor for that mat-
ter is it able, constantly to take the rule into consideration, in act." 
We have here then a lack of being, of perfection and actuality which is not 
an evil. The will is not obliged to constantly consider the rule of rea-
son, and therefore the absence of the rule is not a privation, an absence 
of a due good. It is rather a simple negation, a simple lack of being 
which is merely non-being pure and simple. 
Nor is an act of the will necessary to introduce this Simple 
52 j£. Thomas and !:.!!! Problem £!!!!!. 25. The italicized 
words and bracketed clause appear in the translation. 
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absence. Quite the contrary, that this absence exists is attributable to 
the will inasmuch as it does not act, inasmuch as it does not move reason 
to seek the true good. And here we are brought back to the important dis-
tinction concerning the two ways in which voluntariness is attributable to 
the will. The voluntary extends not only to the will's actions but also 
to its non-actions. It is within the power of the will to act or not act, 
and therefore the very freedom of the will is sufficient to account for 
that first deficiency which, since it is not the absence of a due good, is 
a Simple negation and not yet an evil. A deficiency is thus introduced by 
the nonwaction of the will. Perhaps it is better to say that the deficien-
cy which consists in the non-consideration of the rule of reason before 
the execution of the human act is a lack which naturally accompanies the 
existential state of man. Inasmuch as it is a simple negation this defi-
ciency has no cause, nor could it have one since it is the very lack of 
any cause which "accounts" for simple non-being. What do we mean then when 
we say that the will initiates this deficienc7~ Surely not that the will 
does something, anything, for the result of a will act is being and perfec-
tion. Recall that as the direct efficient cause of the human act the will 
introduces (causes) additional actuality and perfection. What St. Thomas 
means is that the will Simply does nothing to remove this deficiency; and 
since the will could do something, since it could remove the deficiency, 
then by not doing so, by not moving reason to apply its rule the will is 
the source and to that extant the cause of the deficiency. 
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Since, then, by willing and acting, the will is able, and some-
ttmes ought to hinder not-willing and not-acting, this not-will-
ing and not-acting is tmputed to the will as though proceeding 
from it. And thus it is that we can have ~he voluntary without 
an act ••• somettmes without an interior act, as when one does not 
will to act ,,53 
At the moment when the will breaks forth into action with this 
deficiency, with this absence which consists in not looking to the rule of 
reason, at that moment the original deficiency becomes evil. At that mo-
ment the simple negation becomes the absence of a due good, a privation. 
For the craftsman need not always apply his ruler. It is sufficient that 
he apply it when he proceeds to actually cut the wood. Stmilarly in human 
acts: "The faultiness of will does not consist in not paying attention in 
act to the rule of reason or of divine law, but in this:--that without tak-
ing heed of the rule it proceeds to the act of choice.,,54 
53 See Chapter III, page 90, note 16. 
_ _ S4!!!!!!!2, 1, 3c; cf. also ad3; !.I .• I, 49, I, ad3: "This 
Lprio£/defect, however, is not a fault; but fault follows upon it from the 
fact that the will acts with this defect." Also see S.T., I-II, 75, 1. ad3: 
"Now the fact of not applying the rule of reason or of the divine law. has 
not in itlelf the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before 
it is applied to the act." Underlining is mine. And finally, in the SUDIIl& 
Contra Gentiles, III, 10, Saint Thomas says: "Hence a defect of ordering 
to reason and to a proper end precedes a fault of action in the will •••• Now. 
this defect in ordering is voluntary, for to will and not to will lie withi 
the power of the will itself. And it is also within its power for reason 
to make an actual conSideration, or to abstain from such a conSideration or 
further to consider this or that alternative. Yet, such a defect of order-
ing is not a moral eVil, for, if reason considers nothing, or considers any 
good whatever, that is still not a sin until the will inclines to an un-
suitable end. At this pOint, the act of will occur •• " 
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We are now in a position to bring these several elements to-
gether in order to summarize Aquinas' thoughts concerning the causality 
of moral evil. The will is the direct efficient cause of the human act; 
but it is also the deficient or accidental cause of the privation or evil 
of the act. The evil is properly attributed to the will inasmuch as vol-
untarily not having acted, not haVing moved reason to apply its rule "be-
fore" it inclined to its object the will let a deficiency enter into the 
act, a deficiency which inClines to its object. Here we have uncovered 
what Karitain calls the "spiritual element of sin.,,55 
This moment of non-consideration of the rule is so to speak 
the spiritual element of sin. There is a moment of nature, not 
of t~et where the creatures has as yet done nothing, where it 
has as yet made no choice, (that is why there is as yet no fault, 
but mere negation or absence of being) and where nevertheless it 
has already done nothingness in the sense that it has not con-
sidered its rule, freely and voluntarily,--it has put an absence 
at the head of its acting, it has introduced the condition which 
will cause tha texture of being to give way; that is why there 
will be faultiness now that it acts with that voluntary non-con-
sideration; such an act will bear in itself the teeth-marks of 
nothingness. 
On the part of the will we thus see that the efficacy of moral evil in-
volves these two moments: firstly, the will simply does not act, does not 
move reason to apply its rule, and secondly, the will acts, now inclining 
to an object which the will has, in a sense, "caused" to be not measured 
by the rule of reason and to be thereby deprived of what it ought to have. 
55 g. Thomas .!!E. ill Problem .2!!!!!, 32 .. 3. 
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More accurately expressed, the will has not caused its object to be meas-
ured by the rule of reason and the Eternal Law. By not moving reason to 
apply its rule the first defect is not removed, and thus when the will 
breaks forth into action inclining to its object the human act bears the 
wound, the''teeth marks" of nothingness. Notice then, that the will is the 
cause of evil by first doing nothing, by not doing anything, by not acting. 
It has in a sense stood by passively and not removed the defect. When it 
breaks into action with this first defect, a defect which it could have 
removed, a s~ple negation becomes a privation and an evil. 
What of the other causes? Does evil have a formal and final 
cause? Every act performed knowingly and willingly is, as we have ob-
served, a human act. Furthermore, a human act is a moral act. And yet, 
not every hum&n act is morally good. This means that the evil human act 
is an act performed knowingly and willingly, in which case it follows that 
even in evil human acts there i8 an object apprehended by the intellect,--
a final cause; an apprehending intellect,--a formal and in a sense an ac-
cidental final cause; an inclining appetite, the will,--an efficient cause; 
and finally a subject of these operations: the individual man,--a material 
cause. Therefore what characterizes the evilness of a human act is not 
that these causes are absent strictly speaking, but rather that they are 
lacking something which they ought to have. They are present, but a per-
fection has been removed, a perfection and therefore an actuality which is 
due. In a human act this perfection consists in the act being measured by 
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the rule of reason and Eternal Law and that the object, the end, be a pro-
per and due good. Now what constitutes the evil of a human act is the very 
absence of the form of right reason and the absence of the proper end, and 
in this sense evil has neither a formal nor a final cause. 
But evil has no formal cause, but is rather a privation of 
form. So, too, neither has it a final cause, but is rather 
privation of order to the proper end, since it is not only 
the end which haa the nature of good, but also the useful, 
which is ordered to the end. 56 
Evil does have a material cause, however. Since evil is a pri-
vation in some subject, and since the individual taken in his substantial 
unity is the subject of his acts, the subject of moral evil is the indi-
vidual man. And inasmuch as it i8 the individual who is undergoing the 
activity, it is he who is the material cause of the morally evil act. Fur-
ther, since anything is good inasmuch as it exists, and since evil is a 
privation in some existing subject, it follows that good is the subject of 
evil J and that in this sense the good is the caUSE:: of evil: "Now that 
good is the cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above LQ. 
48, a.17. For it was shown that good is the subject of evll.,,57 Properly 
speaking then, there are but two causes of evil. On the one hand there is 
the individual man who a9 the subject of the privation is the material 
cause. It is he who through his evil acts begins to exist evilly. For to 
56 !.!., I, 49, lc. 
57 ~. 
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act is to be; acting 1s a mode of being. Once again recall our starting 
point, namely the empirical evidence that beings exist changingly and ac-
tively. Activity is as much a part of the beings of our experience as is 
stability. The deficiency in which the evil of a human act consists is 
therefore in a very real sense a deficiency in the being and actuality of 
the existent. On the other hand, evil has an accidental efficient cause. 
Here we see that evil has a cause "by way of an agent, not directly, but 
accidentally.IIS8 
It will follow that evil cannot be directly traced back to the 
substance's prtmordial act of existir.g. !!!! is the primary act of the 
existent and therefore the ultimate intrinsic source of all being and be-
coming, of all actuality including the actuality of causality. All of the 
actuality of a human act is therefore grounded in and flows from a sub-
stance's act of existing. Wherever there is being there is.!!.!!. What of 
evil? Inasmuch as evil is non-being, we need not look for, nor would we 
find, its source and cause to be!!!!, as if !!!! could cause ~-!!!!. 
non-being. In a manner of speaking, non-being begins where!!!! leaves off 
Strictly speaking then, !!!! is in no way the direct cause of evil--direct 
cause, that is, because it is in a way its indirect cause. 
St. Thomas says that evil has an indirect cause. In man this is 
a defective will. Now since!!!! is the primary act of being, whatever 
58 ~. 
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actuality and perfection is found in the human act is grounded in !!!!, 
while whatever there is of evil is ultimately though not proximately the 
privation of~. For the human act has a direct efficient cauee, where-
as the evil of the act has but an indirect or deficient cause. Therefore 
inasmuch as the act was directly caused by the will,~re can say that the 
act was grounded in esse. But inasmuch as the act is deficient it is not 
so grounded, for this deficiency consists in the will's not having acted, 
not having caused. And for this non-action there need be no direct in-
trinsic cause properly speaking: neither a proximate cause, i.e., the will, 
nor an ultimate cause, i.e.,!!!!. There is an analogy here. Just as the 
proximate deficient or accidental cause of evil is the will, so the ulti· 
mate deficient or accidental cause of evil is!!!!. !!!! gives actuality 
to the will's acts, acts which directly and efficiently cause the human act 
and which deficiently and accidentally cause the evilness of the act. It 
is in this way that!!!! can be said to be the "cause" of evil. 
God's Causal Influx 
Nor, therefore, is there an ultimate exterior cause of evil. To 
the question of whether the highest good, God, is the cause of evil Aquinas 
answers: 
As appears from what was said, the evil which consists in 
the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. 
But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was 
shown above. Hence the evil which consists in defect of action, 
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or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to 
God as to its cause. 59 
Being all perfect, God is in no wise the cause of the deficiency of the 
human act. Man alone is sufficient to account for this deficiency, though 
he cannot alone sufficiently account for the being and perfection of the 
act. And so St. Thomas says, 
The act of sin is both a being and an act, and in both re-
spects it is from God. lor every being whatever the manner of 
its being, must be derived from the First Being •••• But sin de-
notes a being and an action with a defect. But this defect is 
from a created cause, viz., free choice as falling away from 
the order of the First cause, Viz., God. Consequently, this 
defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to free choice; 
just as the defect of ltmping is reduced to a crooked leg as 
its cause, but not to the power of locomotion, which neverthe-
less causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Ac-
cordingly, God is the cause of the act of sin; and yet He is 
not the cause of Sin, because He does not cause the act to have 
a defect. 60 
Since He is the ultUnate cause of being and perfection God is there-
fore not the cause of evil. For this deficiency which is evil man has, as 
Maritain says, the first initiative. Man hal no need of God in the line of 
59 ~.I., I, 49, 2c. 
60 S.T., I-II, 79, 2c; cf. I-II, 79, lc; S.T., I, 49, 2, ad2: 
"The effect of the defiCient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-
deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as 
regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the 
act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what is unbalanced in 
it does not come from the motive power, but fran the curvature of the lag. 
So, too, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action is reduced 
to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, 
but by the deficient secondary cause." 
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evil because this is~e line of non-being. Evil is introduced into the 
human act by the first initiative of the will which is not an act but a 
non-act, a not-acting, and for this man is sufficient. Nothing is done, 
and this is precisely St. Thomas' point. In order to voluntarily do noth-
ing man has no need of God. Let us close this part of our study then with 
the fitting and remarkable observation of Jacques Maritain: 
Here we have traced evil to its innermost hiding-place: here 
the creature is the primary cause, but negatively; I think we 
might summarize the doctrine in the words of the Gospel: 'With-
out Me you can do nothing.' That text can be read in two ways, 
and these two interpretations clarify the whole problem of cre-
ated freedom in the face of divine freedom. 'Without Me you can 
do nothing,' means: Without Me you can not commit the slightest 
act in which there is being or goodness,--so much for the line 
of good; but if it conc~rns the line of evil, then the text should 
be otherwise interpreted, doing violence to the grammar: 'sine Me 
potestis facere nihil.' Without Me you can do nothingness,-wIth:-
out Me you can introduce into action and being the nothingness 
which wounds them and which constitutes evil. St. Hildegard com-
plained that that very thing, that nihil, that nothing, could be 
done without God, she complained to God because without Dim we 
could do nothingness, for she well knew that if we could do it 
only with Him, then we should never be able to do it, for with 
God only good and only being can be done. QUite obviously non-
being can be "done" only without God. 6l 
SUMMARY 
We have thus returned to our starting point, the fact that be-
ings manifest themselves actively. In the First Chapter we saw that there 
61 St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil, 35-36; also see Maritain's 
Existence and the Existen~94=99 and his:Oi~t la Permission du Mal 
(Paris: Desci;e-de Brouwer, 1963). - - - --
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is change and activity because beings are not only actual, perfect and 
good inasmuch as they exist. They are also ordained for and directed to 
further actuality, additional existence. Beings exist, but their exist-
ence is not all that it can be. Though expressive in terms of appetite, 
their activity is ultimately grounded in their act of existing, in the act 
of a limited!!!! seeking to overcame its limitations as much as it can. 
By acting, substances begin to be completed, begin to be good Simply speak-
ing. Activity is the way open for limited!!!! to overcome ~-!!!!. In 
man, activity takes on a unique character. Possessed of intelligence, man 
is the master of his acts. As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, through 
his intellect and will man is a free agent, being forced neither in regards 
the end nor the means of attaining the end, the apprehended goods. Because 
of thiS, man is the free cause of his actiVities, activities whereby he is 
actually perfecting and completing his being, or whereby he is actually de-
fecting his being. To act humanly is to act morally, to be humanly is to 
be, to exist either goodly or evilly; not absolutely, to be sure,but in 
a certain and most significant sense, as we have seen. 
Following Aquinas' discussion of the nature and causes of moral 
good and evil, we also saw that man is the cause of his good acts in a dif-
ferent way than he is the cause of evil ones. He is the cause of the for-
mer by action, by doing, by actually causing, that is by bringing something 
into being, namely that the act has the due measure of right reason and 
the will's object consequently be a due and proper good. What is important 
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is to see is that in the line of good which is the line of being and actu-
ality, the individual begins-to-be-goodly by acting. Acting, to be sure, 
in a certain way--by moving reason to judge the true good. To act is to 
be; indeed, says St. Thomas, it is to be perfect and to complete one's ~­
~. However, in the former, that is when the person begins-to-be-evilly, 
we saw that here the cause of evil is sUnilarly the individual, but now he 
is the cause by not acting, by not doing, by actually not causing that the 
act be so measured. And so the will is the interior proximate cause of 
evil by not-doing anything when it could and should have acted. But if 
there is no ultimate direct intrinsic cause of moral evil there can be no 
ultimate direct extrinsic cause. In truth, whether God is the ultimate 
cause of moral evil is literally not a problem in St. Thomas' doctrine. On 
the other hand, in the line of moral good God is found to be the ultbnate 
extrinsic cause, and this in no way diminishes the causality nor therefore 
the responsibility of the creature. Men truly earn and deserve praise and 
reward for acting goodly just as they deserve and earn reproach and punish-
ment for acting evilly. Human acts are moral acts and thus to act and to 
be humanly is to act and to be, to eXist, morally. 
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